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DAVID O. TAYLOR

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
exists, at least in part, to achieve goals related to patent law that the
Supreme Court singularly failed to achieve. Since the Federal
Circuit’s inception just over thirty years ago, however, critics have
shifted blame for problems with the patent system from the Supreme
Court to the Federal Circuit. A common criticism that has gained
strength is that the Federal Circuit engages in overly formalistic
adjudication in patent cases. One aspect of this criticism is that the
Federal Circuit too often creates rules to govern patent law. In this
Article, I challenge that critique and defend the Federal Circuit’s
practice of considering the appropriateness of a rule-based
adjudicatory approach to patent law in the context of the present
institutional structure. After evaluating the history of the Supreme
Court’s oversight of the Federal Circuit and assessing normative
bases for the use of rules in patent law, this Article suggests a
framework for evaluating the appropriate degree of rule-based
adjudication in patent law. In short, this Article develops and
defends the position that the Federal Circuit’s consideration of rulebased adjudication reflects not only the expected but also the
preferred practice of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court
whose development of patent law is subject to discretionary review
by a generalized court of last resort.
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Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law
Adjudication: Rules and Standards
DAVID O. TAYLOR*
I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of the patent system in the United States, prior to formation of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, often focused
their criticism on the United States Supreme Court. Sensing an
overburdened Supreme Court or, worse, indifference toward patent law
and its underlying policies, they criticized the Supreme Court based on the
existence of unresolved splits of authority regarding patent law principles
among the regional circuit courts of appeals.1 They viewed the Supreme
Court’s neglect of the patent system as creating or at least contributing to
several problems, including excessive forum shopping, high litigation
costs, low quality adjudication, and a lack of certainty and predictability.2
Moreover, when the Supreme Court did decide patent cases, critics
detected an anti-patent bias.3 In short, regardless of whether the Supreme
Court granted or denied certiorari in patent cases, critics found reason to
*

Assistant Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Harvard Law School, J.D., 2003;
Texas A&M University, B.S., 1999. This Article was funded in part by the John C. Biggers Faculty
Research Fund. I am grateful for the opportunity to present this Article at the IP Scholars Conference
at Stanford Law School and the Patent Conference at Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent
College of Law. Thanks to Kevin Collins, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Paul Gugliuzza, Mark Lemley, David
Olson, Daniel Ravicher, Greg Reilly, David Schwartz, and Ned Snow for their helpful comments on the
issues this Article addresses. Austin Teng provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks go to
Rachel, Caroline, and Emily Taylor. The views expressed in this Article, as well as any errors, are my
own.
1
See, e.g., Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, 77
F.R.D. 63, 92 (1977) (quoting Professor Gambrell’s remark that Supreme Court Justices “haven’t
resolved all the conflicts, obviously, and part of the reason . . . is that they don’t handle enough patent
related issues in order to get the kind of grasp on them and interest in them that’s necessary to provide a
monitoring function”); Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 371 (1975) (“It is our view that the
principal cause of circuit-to-circuit deviations in the patent field stems from a lack of guidance and
monitoring by a single court whose judgments are nationally binding. . . . The Supreme Court is just
too busy to perform anything even resembling a monitoring function on patent-related issues.”).
2
Fourth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, 77 F.R.D.
at 77.
3
This criticism emanated from external critics, as well as the Supreme Court itself. See
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”); Tom Arnold & Jack
Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1257 n.50 (1970) (noting an “antipatent bias of the
Supreme Court”).
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fault the Supreme Court.
Based on the failure of the Supreme Court to resolve divergent
authority in the regional circuit courts of appeals, critics for decades sought
the creation of a single intermediate appellate court to hear appeals in
patent cases.4 They did so to strengthen the U.S. patent system, foster
technological growth and industrial innovation, eliminate forum shopping
among the regional courts of appeal, and increase uniformity and reduce
uncertainty in substantive patent law.5 They ultimately succeeded in
persuading Congress and the President to establish the Federal Circuit in
1982 and vest it, rather than the regional circuit courts of appeals, with
near-exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases.6 Thus, now the
Federal Circuit exists as a semi-specialized court with nationwide
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases at least in part to achieve goals
related to patent law that the Supreme Court singularly failed to achieve.
As a matter of institutional design, however, when Congress and the
President created the Federal Circuit, they did not eliminate the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction to review the judgments of the Federal Circuit in
patent cases.7 Nonetheless, during the Federal Circuit’s first decade, the
Supreme Court issued only one writ of certiorari related to substantive
patent law to the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit’s judgment and adopted its reasoning in that case.8
4
See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. at 371 (suggesting the “creation of a national court” with
“statutory authority to review a meaningful number of patent cases each year”); Wm. Redin
Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 950, 962 (1942) (recognizing “a demand for settling patent appeals in a court with nationwide
jurisdiction”).
5
See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981) (“The Committee is concerned that the exclusive
jurisdiction over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is intended
to alleviate the serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on
patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20
(1981) (“The establishment of a single court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly singled out by the
witnesses who appeared before the Committee as one of the most far-reaching reforms that could be
made to strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation. The new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide
uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable and will
eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in
the field.”); id. at 23 (“[T]he central purpose [in creating the Federal Circuit] is to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of
patent law.”).
6
See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (establishing the
Federal Circuit).
7
See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012) (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court . . . [b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any
civil . . . case . . . .”).
8
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 673–74 (1990) (affirming the Federal
Circuit’s judgment based on its use of a correct interpretation of a statutory exception to infringement).
The Supreme Court also issued two writs of certiorari to the Federal Circuit on procedural issues in the
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Over time, however, critics have shifted the blame for problems with
the patent system from the Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit.9 Indeed,
some commentators now hold the Federal Circuit, rather than the Supreme
Court, responsible for problems with the modern patent system.10 In turn,
some now look to the Supreme Court primarily to save the public from
misguided patent law developed by the Federal Circuit.11 In this regard, it
is important to recognize that in recent years the Supreme Court has
reviewed the Federal Circuit’s cases addressing patent law with increased
frequency.12 For several years, moreover, it consistently vacated or
reversed the Federal Circuit in patent cases13 and, even when affirming its
Federal Circuit’s first decade, vacating and remanding in both instances. See Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819 (1988) (vacating the Federal Circuit’s decision based on
lack of jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (vacating the
Federal Circuit’s judgment due to its failure to address arguments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a)).
9
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 789 (2008) (“[O]bservers of the patent system have voiced
increasingly vociferous complaints about the state of patent jurisprudence, and by extension about the
Federal Circuit.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2007) (“[S]everal commentators and other legal actors are beginning
to place blame for a variety of perceived ills squarely on the Federal Circuit.”).
10
See Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
336, 340 (2005) (summarizing criticisms of the Federal Circuit’s “existence [as] a power appellate
court,” including “prone[ness] to erratic and unpredictable decision-making[,] . . . . changing the law or
making new law without a reasoned and persuasive reason for doing so[,] . . . . [and] endangering long
term certainty because of its rapid and oscillating development of rules through its case law”). Some
critics fault the Federal Circuit generally for problems with the patent system. See Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1441 (2012) (arguing for reconsideration
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction based on the assumption that “patent law’s problems can be traced
in significant part to the Federal Circuit”); Timothy B. Lee, How a Rouge Appeals Court Wrecked the
Patent System, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/how-arogue-appeals-court-wrecked-the-patent-system/ (concluding that the Federal Circuit “wrecked the
patent system”). More often, critics fault the Federal Circuit for problems associated with specific
patent law issues. See, e.g., Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 82, 120 n.463 (2005) (“[T]he Federal Circuit was wholly responsible for allowing software
patents in the first place . . . .”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 266 (2008) (“[T]he
Federal Circuit needs to set forth a more coherent and clear [claim construction] doctrine.”).
11
See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 720 (2009) (“By periodically
taking on merits review in areas where Federal Circuit decisions may have unduly ossified the law, the
Supreme Court can help initiate escapes from suboptimal legal equilibria.”).
12
See infra Part IV.B (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s criticism of the Federal
Circuit’s adjudication of patent law cases).
13
See, e.g., Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (reversing the
Federal Circuit’s decision); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459 (2007) (same); KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (same); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (same); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (vacating
the Federal Circuit’s decision); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (same);
Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) (same); Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
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decisions, adopted alternative reasoning. And, significantly, in some of
the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in patent cases, the Court has
suggested that the Federal Circuit created improperly rigid rules.15
Similarly, several law professors have recently criticized the Federal
Circuit for engaging in overly formalistic rule-based adjudication in patent
cases.16
Condemnation of the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence as
overly formalistic in the sense of over-use of rules has extended to many
patent law doctrines. Critics, for example, have accused the Federal
Circuit of adopting a rigid rule governing the question of patent
eligibility,17 and credited the Supreme Court for eliminating the Federal
Circuit’s rigid rule.18 Similarly, they have blamed the Federal Circuit for
adopting a strict rule making it difficult for patent challengers to prove that
an invention is obvious and, therefore, undeserving of patent protection,19
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (same); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002) (same).
14
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2071 (2011) (affirming using
alternative reasoning); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (same).
15
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415 (“We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the
Court of Appeals.”); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (“[T]he Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant
of . . . relief.”); Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737–38 (“[W]e disagree with the decision to adopt the
complete bar. . . . While this Court has not weighed the merits of the complete bar against the flexible
bar in its prior cases, we have consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way, not a rigid one.”).
16
See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 9 (finding that the Federal Circuit has engaged in
formalistic case parsing); Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) (advocating that the Federal Circuit
abandon its formalistic approach to conform to the Supreme Court’s methodology); Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity]
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic use of rules comes at the cost of fairness); Peter Lee,
Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. &
ARTS 405 (2012) [hereinafter Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit] (explaining that the historical
formalism of the Federal Circuit in patent adjudication desensitizes the court to the facts of each case);
Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Patent Law and
the Two Cultures] (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalism creates a disengagement with
technology); Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012)
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach is sub-optimal); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003)
(asserting that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic approach has had a negative impact on innovation and
has created a need for reform in the patent system); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit,
52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003) (cautioning that the Federal Circuit must consider other priorities in
addition to certainty and predictability).
17
See, e.g., Robert A. Hulse & Robert R. Sachs, Making Sense of the Revived Machine-orTransformation Test in In re Bilski, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2009) (criticizing the
Federal Circuit’s “rigid application of the machine-or-transformation test”).
18
See D. Christopher Ohly, Therasense: Another Case for Rejection of Rigid Rules, 23 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (2011) (using Bilski as an example to advocate for the Supreme Court’s
review of a Federal Circuit ruling).
19
See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2068 (2007) (summarizing
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and praised the Supreme Court for rejecting that rule and making it easier
to do so.20 They have faulted the Federal Circuit for creating a
presumption that injunctive relief follows a finding of liability for patent
infringement,21 and lauded the Supreme Court for favoring accuracy by
eliminating the presumption and injecting discretion into the determination
of whether to grant injunctive relief.22
These critics, however, largely overlook or ignore the responsibility of
the Supreme Court for the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant for rulebased adjudication.23 Instead, with an apparent goal of eliminating rulebased adjudication, they propose increasingly sweeping reforms focused
on the Federal Circuit, its jurisdiction, and its power to develop patent law
as a creature of the common law. Some merely suggest that the Federal
Circuit confront and eliminate its preference for rule-based adjudication.24
Others, however, propose diversifying the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.25
Still others advocate eliminating the exclusivity of the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction over patent cases.26 And some recommend giving the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) substantive rule-making
authority to constrict the Federal Circuit’s role in developing a common

critics of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) test, suggesting that it is an inflexible rule
that “causes patents to issue where the combination of preexisting technologies would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art”).
20
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1276 (2011)
(indicating there were “many reasons [for the Supreme Court] to reject the TSM test”); Natalie
Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia
Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 n.12 (2011) (supporting the prediction that
“[i]n the wake of KSR . . . it will be easier to prove patents obvious”).
21
See, e.g., Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit, supra note 16, at 410 (describing the
presumption as a “syllogistic rule” that “allowed courts to largely ignore factors[,] . . . . reduce
contextual consideration[,] and truncate legal inquiries”).
22
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798–99 (highlighting that in eBay the Court “explicitly
endorsed a rule of discretion for determining whether to grant injunctive relief,” characterizing this
development as “striking a different balance between precision and accuracy,” and favoring the latter).
But see Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2012) (criticizing eBay for its “cataclysmic effect”
outside the area of patent law and suggesting that, “[i]n deciding whether to issue injunctions, courts
would generally do well by continuing to use the kinds of structured sets of presumptions and safety
valves that have characterized traditional equitable practice”).
23
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s policing of rule-based adjudication in the
context of patent law).
24
See Rai, supra note 16, at 1115–22 (discussing the limits of formalism).
25
See Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1441 (arguing for reconsideration of the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction based on the assumption that “patent law’s problems can be traced in significant part to the
Federal Circuit”).
26
See Nard & Duffy, supra note 9, at 1625 (suggesting that at least one extant circuit court should
be empowered to hear patent appeals). But see generally S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1735 (2007) (criticizing Professor Nard and Professor Duffy’s suggestion).
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law governing patents. Some have gone so far as to suggest or, at least
question, whether the Federal Circuit should be abolished.28 What has
remained relatively unexplored is why the Federal Circuit has continued to
favor rules—that is, the normative basis to favor rules in patent cases—and
whether the court should continue at least to consider the appropriateness
of rule-based adjudication in patent cases under the present institutional
structure.
This Article explores the issue of the proper institutional roles of the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court through the lens of general conceptions
of advantages and disadvantages associated with rule-based adjudication
on the one hand, and standard-based adjudication on the other hand.29
Through this lens, this Article studies how the Supreme Court’s
supervision of the development of patent law has changed over time, and
how the Supreme Court should exercise its supervisory powers in the
future. In short, this Article evaluates the responsibility of the Supreme
Court in policing the Federal Circuit’s apparent preference for rule-based
adjudication, assesses normative bases for rule-based adjudication in patent
law, and suggests a framework for the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
to evaluate the appropriate degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law
given the courts’ unique abilities and roles.
This Article reaches several fundamental conclusions. First, contrary
to the theme of the modern critique of the Federal Circuit, the court is
performing its intended role when it considers the usefulness of rules to
govern issues in patent law. Second, it is the Supreme Court’s role to
police the Federal Circuit’s understandable preference for rule-based
adjudication, and any excessive use of inflexible rules in patent law is at
least in part reflective of the Supreme Court’s failure to engage in this
policing role. Thus, it is important to consider how the Supreme Court can
and should engage in this role moving forward. Third, given the reasons
for the creation of the Federal Circuit, as well as other justifications for
rule-based adjudication in patent law, the Supreme Court should temper its
own natural and desirable preference for standard-based adjudication when
27
See Rai, supra note 16, at 1134 (arguing that Congress should give the Patent Office greater
responsibility); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 650 (2012) (proposing giving
the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority).
28
See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 10, at 1496 (“One possibility is that, after cutting over half of
the Federal Circuit’s docket, we simply finish the job by abolishing the court altogether.”).
29
In this Article, I analyze the battle between rules and standards in patent law adjudication—
which may be viewed as a “localized battle” in the larger conflict between formalist and antiformalist
schools of jurisprudence. Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of
Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 224 (2009). Elsewhere I consider another “localized battle” in the
larger conflict—the debate over the primacy of precedent and policy in patent law adjudication. See
generally David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Precedent and
Policy, 66 SMU L. REV. 633 (2013) (examining the importance of the Federal Circuit and its judges
engaging in ongoing policy debate regarding patent law doctrines).
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reviewing the decisions of the Federal Circuit. In short, the Federal
Circuit’s consideration of rule-based adjudication reflects not only the
expected but also the preferred practice of a semi-specialized intermediate
appellate court whose stewardship of patent law is subject to discretionary
review by a generalized court of last resort.
This Article is organized into five parts following this introduction.
Part II considers general conceptions of formalism and antiformalism, with
particular attention given to the advantages and disadvantages associated
with rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication. Part III
studies the Federal Circuit’s tendency to embrace rule-based adjudication.
Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court’s history of oversight of the Federal
Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence and the Supreme Court’s reputation for
rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication.
Part V evaluates the respective institutional roles of the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court in the development of patent law, given the current
institutional structure and the normative bases for rule-based adjudication
in patent law. Finally, Part VI includes some brief concluding remarks.
II. LEGAL FORMS
General conceptions of formalism and antiformalism provide a lens
through which to study the respective roles of the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court within the modern patent system. This Part considers these
general conceptions, with particular attention given to the advantages and
disadvantages associated with rule-based adjudication on the one hand and
standard-based adjudication on the other hand.
A. Formalism and Antiformalism Generally
Scholars have long analyzed and debated legal form separate and apart
from legal substance.30 With respect to the form of the law, they contrast
formalism on one end of the spectrum with antiformalism on the other end
of the spectrum. Classic formalism embraces the view that the law is a
scientific system in which legal institutions use rules to dictate correct
30
See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 25 (1997) (stating that the “[t]he rule of law is about form” and that textualism is “of course
formalistic!”); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 29 (1967) (describing
“legal principles as separate sorts of standards, different from legal rules” in his analysis); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–68 (1992) (offering
an “economic analysis of the extent to which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or
standards” and recognizing that “definition of rules and standards commonly emphasize the distinction
between whether the law is given context ex ante or ex post”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685–94 (1976) (describing the “formally
realizable rule” as the “opposite pole” from a “standard or principle or policy”); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379–81 (1985) (illustrating distinctions between rules and
standards).
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outcomes in all cases. As a branch or particular application of formalism,
adjudicative rule-formalism is the view that judges should construe
positive legal norms as rules such that their future application will be
“mechanical and uncontroversial.”32
Antiformalism, by contrast, maintains that law is a “means to an end,”
where resolution of legal questions turns on views of policies and
anticipated effects.33 Indeed, antiformalism insists that the resolution of
legal questions requires or at least permits resort to sources other than the
text of a rule.34 “Antiformalist doctrine thus is ‘realist’ to the extent that it
responds to the real-world technical, institutional, and economic context in
which [the] law unfolds.”35 Antiformalism therefore focuses on outcomes
and policy objectives while remaining attentive to facts and context.36 To
this end, the antiformalist will look beyond traditional legal authorities and
consult empirical and academic studies, or even foreign or international
law, to shape domestic policies and resolve disputes.37 And while
adjudicative rule-formalism focuses on the use of rules, adjudication based
on antiformalism embraces the use of standards.38
The debate over rules and standards may be viewed as a “localized
battle” in the larger conflict between formalist and antiformalist schools of
jurisprudence.39 Indeed, rules and standards represent polar opposite
approaches to resolving legal questions. This rules-standards dichotomy
may be illustrated by contrasting a law that imposes a fine on a driver who
exceeds a speed limit, with a law that imposes a fine on a driver who drives
at an “excessive speed.”40 The speed limit, of course, represents the legal
rule, while the prohibition on “excessive speed” represents the legal
standard. In addition to this simple pedagogical example, most law
31
See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (1999) (“To the
classical formalists, law meant more: it meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were
complete in that the system made right answers available in all cases.”); see also Tun-Jen Chiang,
Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope, 1 IP THEORY 88, 90 (2010) (“Stated generally, [classic]
formalism is the philosophy that law is a self-contained discipline, and that there is always one ‘correct’
answer to legal problems that can be reached using the internal tools of the discipline, primarily logic,
precedent, and rules.”).
32
Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934,
936 (1999).
33
Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism
(With Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 19–20 (2001).
34
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639
(1999).
35
Lee, Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit, supra note 16, at 411.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 411–12.
38
See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1688 (“At the opposite pole from a formally realizable rule is a
standard or principle or policy.”).
39
Schlag, supra note 29, at 224.
40
Kaplow, supra note 30, at 560.
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students become well acquainted with the two legal forms in their first year
of law school. Classic examples of rules include property law’s rule
against perpetuities and contract law’s statute of frauds, while classic
examples of standards include tort law’s reasonable person standard and
contract law’s unconscionability standard. It is helpful to think of a rule as
any imperative that is capable of determination ex ante (before the event in
question) and a standard as any imperative that must be assessed ex post
(after the event).41 Thus, a speed limit is classifiable as a rule because a
driver can determine with reasonable certainty where the line of illegal
activity is in advance of driving. Tort law’s reasonable person standard is
classifiable as a standard because a party cannot be certain whether he or
she has acted reasonably until after the events have transpired and a court
or jury has weighed the available, admissible evidence regarding the
circumstances and reached a conclusion.
Yet, the classification of a legal principle as a rule or a standard is not
always straightforward or even possible.42 In practice, a legal principle
that, on its face, appears to be a bright-line rule may, in fact, contain a
hidden standard.43 Indeed, vagueness of one or more terms in an otherwise
unequivocal statement can cause an ex ante rule to unravel into an ex post
standard.
As an example from patent law, consider the on-sale bar presently
expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) and (b)(1), which with certain
exceptions bars a patent for any claimed invention that was on sale before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.44 This appears to be a
bright-line rule. But what does it mean for an “invention” to be “on sale”?
If an idea has not been incorporated into something that is built and tested,
for example, can it nevertheless be the subject of an offer for sale? For the
41
See id. at 559–60 (leading a law and economics analysis by first acknowledging the common
conception that rules can be distinguished from standards based on whether an ex ante or ex post legal
determination is possible); cf. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (defining the difference between a rule and a standard
as a function of precision); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1687–88 (describing the quality of “ruleness” as
a matter of degree on a continuum of formal realizability).
42
It is not always clear on the continuum of formal realizability where a rule ends and a standard
begins. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1689 (“The dimensions of generality and formal realizability
are logically independent: we can have general or particular standards, and general or particular rules.
But there are relationships between the dimensions that commonly emerge in practice.”). Indeed,
Professor Sunstein has suggested abandoning attempts at categorization and, instead, inquiring as to the
degree of formalism that is present and appropriate. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640 (“The real
question is ‘what degree of formalism?’”). I adopt this convention below.
43
Professor Isaac Ehrlich and Judge Richard Posner would describe such a rule as relatively
imprecise. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 258 (“The difference between a rule and a standard
is a matter of degreea degree of precision.”).
44
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. V 2011). For descriptions of this example, see Craig Allen
Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 80–83 (2010), and Thomas,
supra note 16, at 778–81.
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better part of two decades, the Federal Circuit applied a totality-of-thecircumstances approach to determining whether an invention had been
placed on sale in such a situation.45 Inventors, however, faced difficult
challenges determining ex ante whether in particular circumstances they
would be barred from obtaining patents on their inventions.46 Difficulty in
applying a standard often encourages courts to develop assistive rules that
cut short the need for a deeper, more fact-intensive inquiry. Thus, out of
concern that the Federal Circuit’s holistic approach produced too much
uncertainty, the Supreme Court eventually replaced the Federal Circuit’s
totality-of-the-circumstances test with its own, more rule-like, two-part test
in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics.47 Such morphing of legal form has led some
scholars to make the general observation that, in time, standards may
crystallize into rules and rules may dissolve into standards.48
B. Advantages and Disadvantages Associated
Adjudication and Standard-Based Adjudication

with

Rule-Based

The potential of legislatures and courts to articulate a rule or a standard
to govern any particular legal issue raises a basic, but important, question.
Is one legal form demonstrably superior to the other? In the long-running
debate over rules and standards, scholars have repeatedly made the case for
one form over the other. When confronted generally with a choice
between formalism and antiformalism, however, the debate among
academics is not close. The concept of formalism is so disparaged that the
term formalism itself is considered by some to be an epithet.49 But, in the
words of Professor Cass Sunstein, “The real question is ‘what degree of
formalism?’ rather than ‘formalist or not?’”50 And to answer this “real
45
See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(requiring consideration of all circumstances surrounding the relevant event and weighing of these
circumstances against policies underlying the on-sale bar).
46
Thomas, supra note 16, at 778–79.
47
Id. at 780. The test announced by the Supreme Court requires (1) a product to be “the subject
of a commercial offer for sale” and (2) “the invention must be ready for patenting.” Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Notably, after highlighting that the Federal Circuit itself had
admitted that its totality-of-the-circumstances test had been criticized as “unnecessarily vague,” id. at
66 n.11, the Supreme Court explained that its new test would not create “unmanageable uncertainty,”
id. at 67.
48
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604 (1988)
(observing a “cyclical pattern” in property law); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 96–97 (1992) (arguing that “the political valences of rules and
standards shift in cycles over time” as the complementary adjudicative form is chosen to countervail
the prevailing political position).
49
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 32, at 934 (indicating that the label “formalist” is “never a
term of endearment, to my ear”); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511 (1988)
(conceding “contemporary aversion to formalism” and advocating for “inspection, rather than . . . a
discourse of epithets”).
50
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640.
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question,” it is important to consider the advantages and disadvantages
associated with rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication.
For proponents of rules, rules are fairer. Rules promote fairness
through consistency of outcome and equality of treatment under the law.51
Rules provide determinate answers to legal questions, which allow for
predictability that fosters efficient private ordering and investment.52
Besides predictability, rules may decrease the possibility of error.53
Indeed, by definition rules cabin judicial discretion54 and, therefore, may
“restrict misguided, incompetent, wicked, power-hungry, or simply
mistaken decisionmakers.”55 Rules encourage impartiality by requiring
judges to ignore non-dispositive facts that may lead to bias or favoritism.56
Rules likewise foster conformity because participants are encouraged to
learn the law to avoid violation of it.57 As Professor Duncan Kennedy put
it, “People will miss fewer trains . . . if they know the engineer will leave
without them rather than delay even a few seconds.”58 Rules written by
legislative bodies may serve as a device to allocate decision-making
authority between Congress and the courts or between courts and an
administrative body.59 Rules developed as part of the common law may
similarly allocate decision-making authority between courts and an
administrative body as well as between appellate and trial judges. Given
the technical nature of disputes arising in patent law, rules can also be seen
as decreasing the “cognitive burden” on generalist judges by providing
them with shortcuts and rules of thumb that curtail deeper inquiry that
requires familiarity not just with patent law, but also with the particular
science or engineering field of the patent in question.60 And for thousands
of patent examiners at the Patent Office, many of whom may not even be
attorneys, rules may foster uniformity of application and eliminate
discretion leading to arbitrary determinations of patentability.
There are, however, common criticisms of rules. “Rules cost more to
51
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989).
Justice Scalia argues that fairness through equality of treatment under the law is more essential to
justice than fairness of a particular result. Id. Indeed, Justice Scalia is an ardent supporter of formalism
based on its ability to constrict the discretion of governmental actors. See SCALIA, supra note 30, at 25
(“Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.”).
52
Nard, supra note 44, at 79–81. In Justice Scalia’s view, while it may not always be possible to
reach a determinate outcome via rules, rules (as opposed to standards) are more likely to keep a judge’s
pen within the margins of what the law will tolerate. Scalia, supra note 51, at 1186.
53
Schauer, supra note 49, at 539–42.
54
Chiang, supra note 31, at 91; Nard, supra note 44, at 87.
55
Schauer, supra note 49, at 543.
56
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 974–75 (1995).
57
Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1697–98.
58
Id. at 1698.
59
Nard, supra note 44, at 89–90.
60
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 25–27.
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promulgate” because proper design demands more information earlier in
the design process and more time spent enumerating inclusions and
exceptions.61 Even when rules are well crafted, rules are often over- or
under-inclusive, leaving a gap between the law’s purpose and its actual
effect.62 Such gaps allow wrongdoers to evade the spirit of a rule by
“engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same
or analogous harms.”63 “Rules are often shown to be perverse through new
developments,” requiring additional expense to keep them contemporary.64
Furthermore, if one purpose of rules is to cabin discretion, this purpose is
frequently frustrated. Rules often require a decision-maker to apply
significant discretion in deciding which rule applies to a particular
situation.65 The transparency of discretion may be transferred to opaque
entities and driven underground in the form of civil disobedience, nonenforcement, or nullification in response to perceived injustice resulting
from the uniform application of a rule.66
On the other hand, proponents of standards tout standards as the fairer
legal form. Standards permit fairness of outcome by tailoring the law to
the facts of each case. Standards are thus attentive to the whole situation
and to the particulars.67 Standards also permit flexibility in the legal
system by allowing decision-makers to adapt to changing circumstances.68
Standards promote accountability regarding the outcome of legal disputes.
In particular, unlike rules, which allow a decision-maker to shield himself
or herself from criticism with the excuse that he or she was merely
following the letter of the applicable rule, standards require a decisionmaker to take responsibility for decisions and to provide “a particularized,
rational account of how” he or she arrives at those decisions.69
Consequently, standards also promote transparency and candor, “allowing
61

Kaplow, supra note 30, at 577.
See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992 (suggesting that rules are very hard to design well because
people often lack enough information to craft rules that will produce sufficiently accurate results).
63
Id. at 995.
64
Id. at 993. Designers of rules cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be
applied. For example, Professor Sunstein observed that the rise of cable television in the 1980s and
1990s revealed a regulatory framework designed for three television networks built on “wildly false
assumptions.” Id. In the field of patent law, this has been argued to be true especially with regard to
defining patent-eligible subject matter. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 614 (2009) (arguing that rules defining patent eligibility
always fail in the long run because the innovation that spurs changing circumstances renders existing
rules obsolete).
65
Sunstein, supra note 56, at 979–80, 985.
66
See id. at 995 (noting how a rule-like, severe sanction for the Clean Air Act’s listed pollutants
led the Environmental Protection Agency to stop listing the pollutants).
67
See id. at 999–1000 (arguing that a system of factors “tends to look closely at a wide range of
particulars”).
68
Nard, supra note 45, at 92.
69
Id. at 97.
62

2013]

FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALSM IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION

429

outsiders to debate the merits and persuasiveness of unelected officials’
work product.”70 In the realm of patents and intellectual property law, a
standard-based approach tailored to particular technologies might also
reduce the costs created by uniform, rule-like grants of intellectual
property rights.71
As with rules, however, there are common criticisms of standards.
With standards, there is difficulty in describing relevant factors ex ante.72
Similarly, there is no a priori sense of the appropriate weight of criteria.73
The uncertain nature of standards ex ante requires participants to invest
more heavily in legal advice in order to help mitigate risk stemming from
uncertainty.74 Standards also cost more to enforce and litigate. Standards
increase the amount of time it takes to dispose of disputes, increasing the
likelihood of error as evidence decays over time.75 Moreover, standards
invite judges to make findings of fact instead of findings of law, thus
invading the natural province of the jury.76
In light of these advantages and disadvantages associated with rules
and standards, at least one scholar has reached the conclusion that the
rules-standards dichotomy has become an irreducible dialectic.77 From this
perspective, one can summarize many of the touted benefits and criticisms
of the two forms using a table of contrasting pros and cons.78 The pros and
cons reduce to nothing more than scripted lines in a ritualized dialogue
about rules and standards79: “We should adopt a rule because it would be
more determinate.” “No, a rule would be too mechanical. We should
adopt a standard, which allows flexibility.” “But, standards aren’t
flexible; they are merely vague.”

70

Id. at 98.
See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property
Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 853, 892–93 (2006) (discussing the problem of intellectual property
protection schemes designed for industries that require high levels of protection, thus raising the costs
of entry for all market participants regardless of whether such protection is warranted). Whether total
cost would be reduced, however, depends upon increased decision-making costs associated with a
standard-based scheme.
72
Sunstein, supra note 56, at 998–99.
73
Id. at 999.
74
Kaplow, supra note 30, at 569.
75
Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 41, at 266.
76
Scalia, supra note 51, at 1180–81.
77
Schlag, supra note 29, at 226; see also Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1710 (“The different values
that people commonly associate with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the
emotive or judgmental words that the advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a
particular issue.”).
78
Schlag, supra note 29, at 226.
79
See id. (charting common patterns in such conversations).
71
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III. FORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Over the past decade, scholars have revived the classic debate over
legal form, but in the context of patent law. The questions they address are
generally bipolar: whether patent law should be promulgated as bright-line
rules or flexible standards, and whether the Federal Circuit is in fact
promulgating bright-line rules or flexible standards. These scholars
generally favor standards—at least compared to the degree to which the
Federal Circuit has favored rules—and many have dubbed the Federal
Circuit as formalist based on the degree to which it appears to favor rules
over standards. In short, critics routinely suggest that the Federal Circuit
improperly enforces rule-based adjudication. This Part studies the Federal
Circuit’s reputation for embracing rule-based adjudication in patent cases
and scholars’ criticisms of its approach.
A. The Reputation of the Federal Circuit
Before considering recent critiques of the Federal Circuit’s use of
rules, it is important to recognize that shortly after its formation at least one
prominent scholar praised the Federal Circuit for its success in bringing
greater predictability to patent law, which at least in part was attributed to
its adoption of various rule-like tests.
1. An Early Assessment
Almost since the Federal Circuit’s inception, Professor Rochelle
Dreyfuss has studied the court and its development of patent law. Five
years after the formation of the court, she authored a seminal article
analyzing the Federal Circuit’s efforts to make patent law more precise and
accurate.80 In the course of her analysis of precision and accuracy,
Professor Dreyfuss commented on the court’s successful use of rules as
legal tests to define patent law.81
With respect to precision, Professor Dreyfuss explained that “[t]he best
measure of precision would be to see whether two courts deciding the same
case reach the same result.”82 She recognized that proponents of the
formation of the Federal Circuit thought improving patent law’s precision
“would foster technological growth and industrial innovation and would
facilitate business planning.”83 Having studied the Federal Circuit’s cases,
she concluded that, at that time, the court had “made strides” in the
80
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
81
See id. at 8, 10–11 (describing the court’s successes in clarifying patent law doctrines using
rules).
82
Id. at 8.
83
Id. at 7.
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direction of making patent law precise. In particular, she highlighted the
success of the court’s use of rules to make patentability determinations
more precise—using decisions regarding obviousness as her primary
example.85 In this regard she noted that “[b]right line rules, objective
criteria, and minimal exceptions may not make for accurate adjudication
(the ‘right’ result in every case), but they create a body of law that is easier
to apply uniformly and to predict with certainty.”86 On the other hand, she
indicated that the Federal Circuit had not done as well clarifying issues that
mainly arise in enforcement proceedings, like the law on monetary
damages.87
Professor Dreyfuss explained that by “accuracy” she referred to the
actual correctness of the results of cases.88 She measured the Federal
Circuit’s success striving for accuracy by “evaluat[ing] the extent to which
the court has formulated rules that reflect sensitivity to the needs of the
technology industry” and “the degree to which the court has attempted to
advance what it regards as national policy.”89 In both senses of accuracy,
she ultimately provided examples of ways in which the court had
attempted to make patent law more accurate.90 She concluded that the
Federal Circuit’s “jurisprudence reveals that the court has begun to make
patent law more accurate, precise, and coherent,”91 and that the court was
“moving in the right direction.”92
Professor Dreyfuss has expounded upon her view that the quality of
decision making by the Federal Circuit should be analyzed, at least in part,
based on accuracy and precision.93 With respect to precision, “the law
must be perceived as stable and predictable so that people can conform
their behavior to it” and so that “parties can predict the outcome of
disputes themselves, [and therefore] resort less frequently to judicial
intervention.”94 As to the relative importance of accuracy and precision,
she appears to have come down on the side of precision, indicating that

84

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–10.
86
Id. at 8.
87
See id. at 11–12 (explaining that the Federal Circuit has not clarified the law governing
monetary damages for patent infringement).
88
Id. at 14.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 14–20 (highlighting various Federal Circuit tests as examples of the court’s efforts to
make patent law more accurate).
91
Id. at 24.
92
Id. at 64.
93
See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (stating the importance of accuracy and precision).
94
Id. at 12–13.
85
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precision is “more important in some respects.”
As she notes, “To
achieve precision, however, courts must sometimes sacrifice accuracy to
ease of application.”96
2. More Recent Assessments
In later assessments of the Federal Circuit’s performance by Professor
Dreyfuss as well as other academics, the Federal Circuit and the goal of
precision or predictability have not fared so well. Indeed, in the last ten
years academics have repeatedly chastised the Federal Circuit for overuse
of rule-based adjudication.
Nearly simultaneously in 2003, shortly after the Supreme Court
rejected as too “rigid” a rule developed by the Federal Circuit to provide
certainty with respect to the doctrine of equivalents,97 Professors Arti Rai
and John Thomas each commented on the tendency of the Federal Circuit
Professor Rai
to engage in formalistic rule-based adjudication.98
recognized that the Federal Circuit seemed to have pursued two anomalous
strategies, vigorous de novo review of questions of fact and application of
formalist, bright-line rules that leave little room for factual inquiry.99 She
argued that Congress made a mistake in institutional design when it
implemented patent reform by focusing on the appellate level.100 In
particular, she identified two deficiencies in the institutional design after
the formation of the Federal Circuit: (1) no institution in the patent system
has expertise necessary to conduct accurate fact-finding, and (2) “no
institution has taken responsibility for elaborating patent law in the factspecific, policy-oriented manner that the language of the [patent] statute
encourages.”101
In her scholarship, Professor Rai addressed the normative question
whether patent law should be promulgated as bright-line rules or flexible
standards,102 but did so based on the assumption that the adoption of
95
See id. at 13 (“Thus, while it is desirable for courts to reach the right (accurate) result in every
case, reaching reproducible results across the array of cases a court hears is more important in some
respects.”).
96
Id.
97
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002)
(indicating that “the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may conserve judicial resources
but is not necessarily the most efficient rule”); id. at 738 (rejecting the complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents and noting that “we have consistently applied the doctrine [of equivalents] in a flexible
way, not a rigid one”).
98
See Rai, supra note 16, at 1037–41 (critiquing the Federal Circuit’s reliance on rule-based
adjudication and advocating for multi-institutional patent reform); Thomas, supra note 16, at 772–75
(providing examples of a shift at the Federal Circuit towards rule-based formalism).
99
Rai, supra note 16, at 1037.
100
Id. at 1040.
101
Id. at 1040–41.
102
See id. at 1074 (asserting that substituting bright-line rules for fact-specific standards is unwise
as a normative matter).
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bright-line rules would not be based on policy considerations.
Indeed,
while she admitted that “formalism is of course eminently defensible as a
normative matter,”104 she argued that “rule-formalism that is opaque to
policy considerations . . . is [nonetheless] a poor fit for [the] patent
statute.”105 Her position was largely based on the nature of the patent
statute, which in her view suggests that Congress “wanted the courts to
engage in relatively wide-ranging interpretation of [its] provisions.”106
Importantly for purposes of this Article, Professor Rai criticized two
arguments in favor of bright-line rules. She rejected the argument that
formalism necessarily reduces decision-making costs, because, depending
on the rule adopted, the result may be expensive, such as an overlypermissive rule regarding patent eligibility that results in a “flood of patent
applications that will clog the Patent and Trademark Office and court
system for years.”107 She also recognized that while “bright-line rules may
increase predictability for future cases, they can upset expectations quite
dramatically when they are first enunciated.”108 Based on these and related
arguments, she concluded that rule-based adjudication without
consideration of policy in the arena of patent law is inappropriate.109 And
while she contended that formalism is a poor fit for the patent statute,
Professor Rai concluded that “the Federal Circuit’s approach to decisionmaking has been decidedly formalist.”110 Indeed, in her view, “there can
be no serious dispute that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is formalist in
its orientation.”111
Professor Thomas also addressed the Federal Circuit’s bent toward
rule-based adjudication in scholarship published the same year as Professor
Rai’s article.112 In his scholarship, Professor Thomas suggested that there
is a common theme in the Federal Circuit’s decision making, and that is a
movement toward rules rather than standards.113 He pointed out that, in the
beginning, the mission of the Federal Circuit was to eliminate
inconsistencies in patent law, but after succeeding on that front the court’s
mission became certainty and predictability.114 He explained the court’s
preference for rule-based adjudicative formalism based on the legislative
103

Id. at 1101–02.
Id. at 1115.
105
Id. at 1102 (emphasis added).
106
Id. at 1116.
107
Id. at 1121.
108
Id. at 1174–75.
109
Id. at 1102.
110
Id. at 1103–04.
111
Id. at 1115.
112
See generally Thomas, supra note 16 (cautioning that the Federal Circuit must consider other
priorities in addition to certainty and predictability).
113
Id. at 792.
114
Id. at 794.
104
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history surrounding the court’s formation, the preference of the patent bar,
the desire to simplify complex law, and the goal of providing the Patent
Office with easily-administrable rules.115 As a normative matter, however,
he cautioned against rule-based formalism in patent law.116
Around the same time, Professor Dreyfuss similarly criticized the
Federal Circuit for formalistic citations to precedent and debate over how
to construe language in that precedent to the exclusion of consideration of
extra-judicial materials including legal and economic scholarship.117 In the
process, she noted her belief that, while “formalism creates bright line
rules that are easy for lower courts to apply,” the Federal Circuit’s
formalism—construing language in precedent “to the exclusion of policy
considerations”—does not make it easy for lower courts to apply the
law.118
Professor Dreyfuss addressed the Federal Circuit’s tilt toward rulebased adjudication in more detail a few years later. After reasserting her
earlier conclusion that the Federal Circuit had continued to make patent
law “more determinate in that it is easier to predict outcomes,”119 she noted
that “[n]onetheless, observers of the patent system have voiced
increasingly vociferous complaints about the state of patent jurisprudence,
and by extension about the Federal Circuit.”120 According to Professor
Dreyfuss, “[T]he Supreme Court’s unprecedented activity in the patent
arena indicates that it too is concerned about the Federal Circuit’s
performance.”121 The problem, as she sees it, is that—even if precision is
more important than accuracy in some respects—the Federal Circuit’s
patent law too often favors precision to the detriment of accuracy. She
explains that “[t]he Supreme Court’s reversals and vacatur of Federal
Circuit opinions can be taken as striking a different balance between
precision and accuracy.”122 In short, the Federal Circuit favors precision
115

Id. at 794–96.
Id. at 796–810.
117
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 780–83 (2004).
118
Id. at 778 n.33 (emphasis added).
119
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 789. In particular, she cited studies showing that doctrinal
developments made the law of non-obviousness “quite predictable,” id. at 793 (citing Petherbridge &
Wagner, supra note 19), that “indeterminacy regarding other major patent law issues, such as
infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct, declined,” id. (citing Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure
of Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025
(2007)), that claim construction is as determinate as contract interpretation in other circuits, id. at 793–
94 (same), and that more generally “the judges of the Federal Circuit have, in large part, coalesced
around particular interpretations of patentability law and display few ideological differences,” id. at 794
(citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases,
10 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2001)), which would interfere with the predictability of the court’s decisions.
120
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 789.
121
Id. at 791.
122
Id. at 798.
116
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and predictability, which may be achieved more often using rules, while
the Supreme Court favors accuracy and therefore more standard-based
approaches.123 And Professor Dreyfuss appears to side with the Supreme
Court in terms of the right balance. In her view, the Federal Circuit has not
found the right balance between precision and accuracy and therefore
between rules and standards.124
As to finding the right balance, she has emphasized the tension
between predictability and accuracy, “the effort to produce predictable law
[and] the goal of generating law that accurately responds to national needs
and policies.”125 As an example of an area in which the Federal Circuit has
not found the right balance between predictability and accuracy, and where
indeed the court’s efforts to use bright lines rules to enhance predictability
have had negative consequences, Professor Dreyfuss pointed to
patentability.126 In her words: “When bright-line rules drive the standard
of patentability so low that economists, the Federal Trade Commission,
and the National Academies become concerned about impenetrable patent
thickets, it is time to reconsider the tradeoffs the court has made, even
while acknowledging that it faces a difficult task.”127
She concluded that the Supreme Court’s many decisions reversing and
remanding cases decided by the Federal Circuit—not just on issues related
to patentability—reflect a rethinking of the proper balance between
predictability and accuracy, with the Supreme Court giving more emphasis
to accuracy.128 She highlighted KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.129 as
an example of a case where the Federal Circuit used a rule to increase
predictability—the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
(“TSM”) test—and the Supreme Court rejected a rigid application of that
rule in order to achieve the right result.130
Professors Dreyfuss, Rai, and Thomas are not alone. Most scholars
have come to the same conclusion, albeit from different angles. In short,
most scholars criticize the Federal Circuit for its perceived penchant for
rule-based adjudication. These critics have identified several areas of
patent law in which the Federal Circuit has adopted rule-based adjudication
123
See id. at 797–800 (summarizing a series of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions and
concluding that “the problems with the Federal Circuit appear to be largely related to the question of
accuracy”).
124
See id. at 800 (discussing the need of the Federal Circuit to find the correct balance between
accuracy and precision).
125
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 835 (2010).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 835–36 (footnote omitted).
128
Id.
129
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
130
Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 836.

436

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:415
131

over standard-based adjudication: subject matter eligibility;
claim
construction;132 the written description requirement;133 the non-obviousness
requirement;134 offer-to-sell type infringement;135 the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel;136 the common law
experimental use defense;137 antitrust and patent misuse defenses;138
permanent injunctions;139 and the entire market value rule.140 In view of
the vast array of these doctrines, consider Professor Timothy Holbrook’s
apt summary: “The tendency towards crystal rules at the Federal Circuit
transcends any particular issues in patent law.”141
The Federal Circuit, however, has indicated it may be willing to reject
rigid rules in favor of flexible standards. A relatively recent en banc
opinion by the Federal Circuit in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc.,142 for example, cuts against rule-based formalism on the
issue of indirect infringement. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit
addressed the law of joint infringement.143 In prior case law, the Federal
Circuit had created a bright-line rule—the so-called “single entity rule”—
that one party must perform each and every limitation of a patent claim in
order to find inducement of infringement.144 The court overruled that prior
case law, concluding that, for purposes of indirect infringement, multiple
entities’ actions may be combined to show that each and every limitation
of a patent claim is performed.145 Significantly, the court based its decision
131

Rai, supra note 16, at 1103–07; Thomas, supra note 16, at 786–89.
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 3; Lee, Patent Law and the Two
Cultures, supra note 16, at 29; Rai, supra note 16, at 1090. But see Chiang, supra note 31, at 89
(“Once we look beyond the rhetoric, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is just as flexible and
indeterminate as any other area of law. This is particularly true of patent scope.”).
133
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 2.
134
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798–99; Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16,
at 3; Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 35–39; Rai, supra note 16, at 1050–51;
Thomas, supra note 16, at 789.
135
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 2.
136
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 820–21; Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16,
at 3–5; Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 33–35.
137
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798; Rai, supra note 16, at 1103–04.
138
Rai, supra note 16, at 1103–10.
139
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798; Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 39–
41.
140
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 798.
141
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 2.
142
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
143
See id. at 1338 (“[W]hen the acts necessary to give rise to liability for direct infringement are
shared between two or more actors, doctrinal problems arise”).
144
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
418 F.3d 1282, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that users of an accused system could not infringe
method claims in the United States because one step of the method was performed in Canada).
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Akamai Techs., Inc., 692 F.3d at 1306.
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on its view of the relevant policies : “At the end of the day, we are
persuaded that Congress did not intend to create a regime in which parties
could knowingly sidestep infringement liability simply by arranging to
divide the steps of a method claim between them.”147
Similarly, the Federal Circuit also relatively recently eliminated a rule
of thumb that it had repeatedly allowed experts to use as a baseline to
determine damages in patent cases.148 Previously, “[t]he 25 percent rule of
thumb ha[d] been used to approximate the reasonable royalty rate that the
manufacturer of a patented product would be willing to offer to pay to the
patentee during a hypothetical negotiation.”149 The court rejected use of
this rule of thumb, concluding that “[e]vidence relying on the 25 percent
rule of thumb is . . . inadmissible” under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.150 and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 “because it
fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”151
Thus, the court based rejection of a formalist rule on general legal
principles governing expert testimony.
Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s elimination of these bright line rules
portends a shift in the court’s willingness to regulate its own preference for
formalistic rule-based adjudication. Only time will tell. These cases do
show, however, that the Federal Circuit may reject rule-based adjudication
based on its own analysis of policy and general legal principles.
B. Critics’ Suggested Changes
To the extent that scholars have criticized patent law for excessive use
of rule-based tests, most focus their criticisms on the Federal Circuit’s
decisions to create or invoke these tests and then propose various changes
to eliminate or reduce incentives for the Federal Circuit to make these
decisions. Professor Rai, for example, made two main, related arguments
for reform. First, she argued that the fact-finding ability of both trial courts
and the Patent Office needed to be improved.152 Second, she argued that
“primary responsibility for fact finding—and for law application where the
case turns on factual findings rather than elaboration of the law in a
manner useful for future cases—should rest with the [Patent Office] and
146
See id. at 1318 (“While we believe that our interpretation of section 271(b) represents sound
policy, that does not mean that we have adopted that position as a matter of policy preference. . . . In
these cases, we conclude that it is unlikely that Congress intended to endorse the ‘single entity rule,’ at
least for the purpose of induced infringement, . . . which would permit ready evasion of valid method
claims with no apparent countervailing benefits.”).
147
Id.
148
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
149
Id. at 1312.
150
509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
151
Uniloc USA, Inc., 632 F.3d at 1315.
152
Rai, supra note 16, at 1077–101.
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the trial courts” rather than the Federal Circuit.
She summarizes her
thesis nicely: “[T]o the extent that the fact-finding capacity of the inferior
decisionmakers has been fortified, it is difficult to justify patent formalism
on the grounds that these decisionmakers need to be tightly controlled.”154
In Professor Rai’s view, fact-finding by the Federal Circuit is
inaccurate and inefficient, and rule-based adjudication is inappropriate for
patent law.155 Therefore, it is not surprising that Professor Rai’s ultimate
suggestions are to improve the fact-finding capability at trial courts and
then eliminate rule-based adjudication at the Federal Circuit.156 What is
remarkable, however, is that several of the specific proposals noted by
Professor Rai have been adopted. Indeed, the fact-finding ability of both
trial courts and the Patent Office have improved quite dramatically since
2003.
With respect to the suggestion of improving fact-finding by trial
courts, Congress and President Obama enacted a new law “to encourage
enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.”157 This
program, the so-called “Patent Pilot Program,” allows judges in certain
district courts to take a disproportionate share of the patent cases filed in
their districts.158 Since these judges can semi-specialize in patent law, the
hope is that there will be a reduction in the rate of reversals by the Federal
Circuit based on claim construction and other patent law issues without
negatively impacting the time between filing and trial or summary
judgment. Time will tell whether this program increases the confidence of
the Federal Circuit in the ability of district courts to engage in complex
fact-finding and to apply complex patent law, which could result in
reduced rule-based adjudication.
With respect to the suggestion of improving fact-finding at the Patent
Office, even more changes have been made. First, the Patent Office has
been given authority to set its own fees159 and a reserve fund has been
established to collect fees in excess of the amount Congress appropriates to
the Patent Office.160 Moreover, Congress is not allowed to appropriate
funds from this reserve fund for any purpose other than to fund Patent
Office activities.161 Second, the Patent Office has been given responsibility
153

Id. at 1065–66.
Id. at 1122.
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Id. at 1090–91.
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Id.
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Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674, 3674
(2011).
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Id.
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Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011) (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41).
160
Id. § 22, 125 Stat. at 336 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 42).
161
Id. There is an ongoing dispute over the legality of recent sequestration of the Patent Office’s
funds. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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to conduct additional post grant proceedings.
Third, it has been given
more rulemaking authority.163 Fourth, it has hired a Chief Economist.164
Given all of these changes, one similarly wonders whether the Federal
Circuit will have more confidence in the ability of the Patent Office to
engage in complex fact-finding and to apply complex patent law, which
could also result in a reduced need for rule-based adjudication in patent
law.
While Professor Rai generally limited her delineation of suggestions to
ways to improve the fact-finding ability of the Patent Office and trial
courts, another avenue to improve patent law adjudication is to improve the
Federal Circuit’s ability to set policy in the form of the rules and standards
it adopts to govern important issues in patent law. One might argue that
courts are not the right institution to set policy. There are good reasons
supporting this argument, including the institutional limitations and ad hoc
nature of litigation. However, as Professor Rai concedes, given the patent
statute, Congress appears to have delegated at least some policy-making
power to the court system.165 Thus, another response to criticism of the
Federal Circuit’s adoption of rules in various circumstances is to improve
the ability of the Federal Circuit to determine when rule-based adjudication
is appropriate, and to improve the quality of any rules it creates. Yet
another response, as this Article suggests, is to focus on the role of the
Supreme Court to police excess rule-based adjudication at the Federal
Circuit.
Professor Thomas’s analysis provided fewer suggestions for change
than it did suggestions for caution based on the “potentially unattractive
consequences of . . . adjudicative rule formalism.”166 He highlighted
dangers associated with the imposition of rules to govern all of the
innovation industry when “it may be desirable to tailor patent doctrine to
APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS:
A
BRIEF
EXPLANATION
3–4
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20906.pdf. (noting that there is disagreement over whether fees
collected are subject to sequestration).
162
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, 125 Stat. at 299 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(a)).
163
The America Invents Act gives the Patent Office some authority to engage in rule-making,
including arguably some substantive rule-making authority. See id. § 10, 125 Stat. at 316 (“The
Director [of the Patent Office] may set or adjust by rule any fee established, authorized, or charged
under title 35, United States Code, or the Trademark Act of 1946 . . . .”); see also Tran, supra note 27,
at 620 (noting that the Supreme Court began to restore rule-making power to the Patent Office in
1999). But even if the Patent Office were given extensive substantive rule-making authority, it seems
likely that it would favor rule-like tests rather than standard-like tests to govern the activities of its
patent examiners, which number in the thousands.
164
See Office of Chief Economist, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ip/off
icechiefecon/index.jsp (last modified Aug. 5, 2013) (“The USPTO established the Office of the Chief
Economist (OCE) in March 2010.”).
165
Rai, supra note 16, at 1041.
166
Thomas, supra note 16, at 797.
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the ever-changing conditions of different industries.”
He raiseed the
possibility that the Federal Circuit’s rules may actually increase the
burdens on the Patent Office, “both in terms of enlarging the number of
applications filed and the costs of the administrative process itself.”168 And
he questioned “whether adjudicative rule formalism will achieve its goals
of certainty, predictability, and doctrinal stability” given the Federal
Circuit’s own difficulty following the rules it has created and sustained.169
He ultimately concluded that “sound innovation policy and due regard for
administrative ramifications, along with a healthy skepticism over whether
certainty can be practically achieved, suggests the desirability of more
nuanced alternatives” to rule-based adjudication.170
Professor Dreyfuss, for her part, has suggested a myriad of reforms “to
avoid the need for rules that produce precision but reduce accuracy and
quality.”171 For the moment, I focus on her suggested reforms that do not
relate to the Supreme Court’s oversight of the Federal Circuit. In this
context, she considers and rejects the ideas of removing exclusive
jurisdiction from the Federal Circuit, placing “‘entrepreneurial judges’ who
excel at developing new rules” on the Federal Circuit, and giving the
Patent Office substantive rule-making authority.172 She supports the
appointment of better judges to the Federal Circuit.173 But she also
advocates attracting “more academically oriented, as opposed to
practitioner-oriented, law clerks,” encouraging Federal Circuit judges to
visit other courts and judges from other courts to visit the Federal Circuit
to improve its culture, and having new Federal Circuit judges attend an
orientation program to foster new norms at the Federal Circuit.174
As shown, these scholars have proposed various reforms to reduce the
Federal Circuit’s apparent penchant for rule-based adjudication in patent
law. However, few scholars—besides Professor Dreyfuss, as we shall
see—focus on the Supreme Court and its responsibility for policing the
Federal Circuit. I turn to that subject next.
IV. ANTIFORMALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT
A robust study of formalism by the Federal Circuit must consider the
role of the Supreme Court given its status as the nation’s court of last
resort. While the Federal Circuit has a reputation as a formalist court
167
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based on its preference for rules, the Supreme Court has a reputation as an
antiformalist alternative by overturning the Federal Circuit on a number of
key issues in patent law and, in particular, replacing the Federal Circuit’s
bright-line rules with more open-ended standards.175 As will be seen, some
scholars have given anecdotal treatment of the Supreme Court’s oversight
of the Federal Circuit. This Part, however, studies each patent case in
which the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Federal Circuit
and resolved an issue specific to patent law between 1982 and 2012, the
first three decades of the Federal Circuit’s existence. This Part thus
analyzes the Supreme Court’s reputation for standard-based adjudication in
patent cases and, moreover, its history of policing the Federal Circuit’s
rule-based adjudication.176
A. A Largely Overlooked Area of Study
There has been surprisingly little academic discourse regarding the role
of the Supreme Court in policing the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant
for rule-based adjudication. In her scholarship questioning the Federal
Circuit’s preference for rules over standards, Professor Rai merely
suggested “sustained,”177 “serious,”178 and “aggressive”179 review by the
Supreme Court in “patent cases that raise not only allocation of power
issues but also issues of substantive patent law and policy.”180 In her view,
“The Supreme Court’s . . . interest in patent law is particularly welcome to
the extent that at least some Justices on the Court have indicated an explicit
awareness of the need to discipline the Federal Circuit.”181 In his
scholarship on the same subject, Professor Thomas did not provide
normative direction concerning the responsibility of the Supreme Court to
police the Federal Circuit’s formalism.182
Professor Dreyfuss, in contrast, has studied the relative roles of the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in creating rules and standards in patent
175
See, e.g., Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 42–47 (describing the
Supreme Court’s holistic approach, which pushes back against the Federal Circuit’s formalism).
176
While this Part studies patent cases passing through the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
sometimes grants certiorari to other courts and indirectly reviews the Federal Circuit’s precedent
related to patent law. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230–38 (2013)
(considering Federal Circuit precedent on antitrust issues arising from settlements of patent litigation);
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063–69 (2013) (considering Federal Circuit precedent regarding
federal jurisdiction over state law malpractice claims based on patent issues); Already, LLC v. Nike,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 729–30 (2013) (considering Federal Circuit precedent regarding the effect of
covenants not to sue on patent litigation).
177
Rai, supra note 16, at 1102.
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180
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law. In particular, she has compared the advantages of generalist and
specialized courts handling specialized subject matter in terms of the
courts’ abilities to make the law governing the specialized subject matter
more accurate and precise. For example, she has explained that, “[s]ince
generalist judges are confronted with the specialty subject matter
infrequently, they lack the motivation, experience, and time to develop an
understanding of the law.”183 In particular, “[t]hey decide the occasional
case based upon a cursory understanding of policy and receive limited
feedback on how well they fared.”184 By contrast, the “specialized court’s
sustained involvement with a field would facilitate superior
decisionmaking” because it “would be in a better position to understand
when it is appropriate to sacrifice accuracy” for precision and vice versa.185
Besides considering the theoretical advantage of the more specialized
court in identifying when standards and accuracy should be sacrificed for
rules and predictability, Professor Dreyfuss has considered the Supreme
Court’s role in striking the appropriate balance between precision and
accuracy in patent law adjudication. After recognizing that the Federal
Circuit has emphasized precision through repeated adoptions of rules in
patent cases, she has noted that the Supreme Court’s reversals and vacaturs
of Federal Circuit patent cases have struck “a different balance between
precision and accuracy.”186 She highlights, however, that the Supreme
Court generally has not paid “enough attention to exert any real influence
on patent jurisprudence . . . . [and, moreover,] the Court’s failure to
consider Federal Circuit rulings has fostered reliance interests that
potentially make revision of Federal Circuit law [adopting rules] more
difficult to accomplish.”187 Thus, she stresses the need for more attention
on patent law from the Supreme Court. She recognizes, however, the
difficulty the Supreme Court and parties have identifying important cases
for Supreme Court review given that “the decision to concentrate disputes
in the Federal Circuit means that the likelihood of circuit splits approaches
zero.”188 Instead, parties must resort to arguments that Federal Circuit
decisions conflict with Supreme Court precedent or old regional circuit
decisions.
In terms of solutions to these problems with the Supreme Court’s
oversight, Professor Dreyfuss considers possible changes both to and
183

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378.
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within the current institutional structure. As to the role of the Supreme
Court within the current institutional structure, one reform she suggests
would be for the Supreme Court to permit the Federal Circuit to reject
district court factual determinations outside of the requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52 to show clear error.189 For example, she
recommends that the Supreme Court reconsider Dennison Manufacturing
Co. v. Panduit Corp. and its application of Rule 52 to the Federal Circuit’s
oversight of factual determinations of district courts in patent cases.190
Indeed, she has suggested that the Federal Circuit’s use of rigid rules in
substantive patent law—and their associated sacrifice of flexibility for
predictability—results from this application of Rule 52.191 While the
requirement that appellate courts affirm factual findings made by district
courts unless they are clearly erroneous makes sense in most
circumstances, it is less compelling if an appellate court has a better “grasp
of the facts” compared to the district court.192 And, according to Professor
Dreyfuss, “the Federal Circuit’s grasp of the facts was clearly better than
the trial court’s” grasp of the facts in Dennison.193
Thus, in Professor Dreyfuss’s view, the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Dennison—which fails to address the Federal Circuit’s comparative
advantage in fact-finding vis-à-vis non-specialized trial courts—is one of
the root causes of the Federal Circuit’s preference for rules in its oversight
of the application of patent law by those trial courts. Consider, however,
the Federal Circuit’s similar preference for rules in its oversight of the
application of patent law by the Patent Office. For example, the TSM rule
adopted by the Federal Circuit to govern the non-obviousness inquiry
applied not only to trial courts but also to the Patent Office.194 Compared
to the Federal Circuit, however, the Patent Office is even more specialized,
particularly with regard to areas of technology.
What explains the Federal Circuit’s use of rules given the Patent
Office’s apparent comparative advantage understanding technology? One
might attempt to tell a similar story. In particular, in Dickinson v. Zurko,195
the Federal Circuit tried to apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to
the Patent Office’s decisions, but—like in Dennison—the Supreme Court
189

Id. at 806.
Id. at 813–14 (citing Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per
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Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and
Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 797–99 (2010).
192
See id. at 797–98 (stating that Rule 52 applied even though the Federal Circuit had a better
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See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1446–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying the TSM test to a
rejection of a patent application by the Patent Office).
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pushed the court down to a more deferential standard of review, in this
context the substantial evidence standard.196 The Federal Circuit wished to
apply a less deferential standard, perhaps because the Federal Circuit
believes it can just as easily understand technology or perhaps because
patent examiners have substantially less experience with patent law.197
The Supreme Court’s rejection of a heightened standard of review in
Zurko, like in Dennison, theoretically might drive the Federal Circuit to
rely on more rule-like tests.
So, really, there are two cases creating standards of review more
deferential than the Federal Circuit might like. Perhaps Zurko is more
appropriate than Dennison, considering that the Patent Office has some
expertise—particularly more experience with technology compared to the
trial courts—but it is another instance of the Federal Circuit’s not being
able to intervene as much as it or others might want given its relative
experience and expertise (legal and/or technical) compared to the inferior
decision-makers. To test the proposition that Zurko may have created a
reason for the Federal Circuit to favor rules governing the Patent Office,
however, the relevant time period to analyze is the later time period after
the Zurko decision,198 and, as an example, the Federal Circuit applied the
TSM test to the Patent Office long before that later time period.199
That said, having a semi-specialized appellate court and its potential
impact on the selection of the appropriate standard of review of factual
determinations, while not accounted for in Dennison, was expressly
considered in Zurko. In particular, the Court rejected the semi-specialized
nature of the Federal Circuit as a reason for a more invasive standard of
review of decisions of the Patent Office. The Federal Circuit’s
“comparative expertise, by enabling the Circuit better to understand the
basis for the [Patent Office’s] finding of fact, may play a more important
role in assuring proper review than would a theoretically somewhat stricter
standard.”200 In other words, according to the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit’s expertise enabled it to provide better review under the applicable
standard; it did not justify making the standard less deferential.201 But,
196
See id. at 152–53 (concluding that the Federal Circuit must review findings of fact made by the
Patent Office using the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act rather than the clearly
erroneous standard).
197
See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) (lacking a prerequisite for
patent examiners to have attended law school). That said, it is less obvious how the relative lack of
knowledge of the pertinent law would justify a less deferential standard of review regarding factfinding.
198
While the Supreme Court decided Dennison in 1986, it more recently decided Zurko in 1999.
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See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1447 (applying the TSM test to the Patent Office in 1992).
200
Zurko, 527 U.S. at 163.
201
The Supreme Court also indicated that there does not appear to be any real practical difference
between a review for clear error and a review for substantial evidence. Id. at 162–63. One might not
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regardless, if Professor Dreyfuss is right about Dennison, then Zurko might
be another Supreme Court holding that provides at least some motivation
for the Federal Circuit to resort to more rule-like tests governing factfinding—this time by the Patent Office.
Indeed, according to Professor Dreyfuss, as a result of its obligation to
apply Rule 52, the Federal Circuit adopted two approaches in its quest to
create more precise patent law: (1) creating rules (“specific analytical
techniques”) governing factual questions underlying legal doctrines like
the non-obviousness requirement; and (2) “classifying many of the more
complex technical issues as questions of law, rather than issues of fact, so
that Rule 52 would not bar de novo review.”202 “The Federal Circuit has,
in short, efficiently canvassed the ways in which it can bring its expertise
to bear on the facts that affect the outcome of technologically complex
cases.”203 As Professor Dreyfuss highlights, the Supreme Court has at least
once approved of the second approach (classifying issues as questions of
law), but it appears to have real problems with the first approach (creating
rules).204 According to Professor Dreyfuss, “[T]he Supreme Court is busy
dismantling the [rules].”205
Besides suggesting that the Supreme Court change Rule 52 to account
for the Federal Circuit’s expertise and experience,206 Professor Dreyfuss
has suggested that the Federal Circuit write “more accurate and better
reasoned” decisions.207 In this regard, she has criticized the Federal Circuit
for “fail[ing] to instill confidence in its decisions [creating rule-like tests]
because it rarely tests the accuracy of its positions by trying to explain
them” using policy-oriented reasoning.208 She suggests that the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court engage in a dialogue, where the Federal
Circuit “articulate[s] the theory on which it is relying” and the “policies it
is adopting.”209 While she is “somewhat skeptical about over-reliance on
rigid rules,” she does “credit [the Federal Circuit] for taking its role in
supervising the lower courts seriously” and suggests that the Supreme
Court consider the importance of creating clear and predictable law.210
be able to make a similar statement in the context of the standard of review for trial courts’ factfinding, depending on what one would use to replace a clear-error standard. For example, a simple
error standard compared to a clear-error standard would appear to make a substantial difference.
202
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203
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But, in the meantime, the Federal Circuit might temper its own preference
for rules as the means to achieve predictability in favor of “[w]ellarticulated policy.”211 In sum, if the Federal Circuit could reverse incorrect
factual determinations without finding clear error, and if it could write
more persuasive opinions, Professor Dreyfuss believes the Federal Circuit
would develop a patent law that relies less on rules and more on
standards.212
Professor Dreyfuss also suggests that the Supreme Court may be able
to influence the Federal Circuit’s preference for rule-based adjudication.
To do so, however, given resistance by the Federal Circuit, the Court “will
likely have to decide a few more cases and write sharply worded opinions
that clearly state what it sees as the problems and how it thinks the court
should go about correcting them.”213 She advises that, if the Supreme
Court decides that the Federal Circuit is “just one more appellate court,”
then the Court “ought to make more explicit the direction that patent law
should take.”214 But, if the Supreme Court decides that the Federal Circuit
is a “tribunal with a unique role in shaping patent law,” then the Court
“needs to reshape procedural law”—presumably Rule 52—“to take that
role into account.”215 More generally, she also has argued that the
Supreme Court needs to “help the Federal Circuit find the ‘sweet spot’
between rigid rules and standards.”216
Other than Professor Dreyfuss, Professor John Golden has focused on
the Supreme Court’s ability generally to police the development of patent
law by the Federal Circuit.217 Professor Golden, however, has suggested
that those dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal choices—and
even those concerned with its formalistic rule-based adjudication—should
be wary of Supreme Court intervention.218 He emphasizes that cost, delay,
uncertainty, and lack of predictability result from the Supreme Court’s
intervention in patent cases, with the possible result that substantive patent
law articulated by the Supreme Court will be worse than that articulated by
the Federal Circuit.219 In particular, he challenges the notion that the
Supreme Court is a generalist court, reminds readers that it has no
expertise in patent law, suggests that it may be at least as subject to capture
as the Federal Circuit, and explains that it may be subject to manipulation
211

Id. at 805.
Id.
213
Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 825.
214
Id. at 828.
215
Id.
216
Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 799.
217
See Golden, supra note 11, at 672–73 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s role with regard to
substantive patent law).
218
Id. at 686.
219
Id. at 687–88.
212

2013]

FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALSM IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION

447

220

and error.
He identifies two Supreme Court opinions illustrating problems with
manipulation and error: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.221 and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.222 Regarding the former, he
concludes that it “illustrates (1) the costs in uncertainty and disruption that
Supreme Court intervention typically produces and (2) the poor
craftsmanship that can mark the Court’s opinions on questions of
substantive patent law.”223 Regarding the latter, he points out how the
Court similarly “tripped over problems that the Court did not even
recognize existed” and, moreover, “deliver[ed] a complementary blow to
the generalist court rationale for Supreme Court review” by mishandling an
issue that had to do with a general legal principle rather than a patent law
principle.224
He points out that, given the lack of intercircuit splits regarding
substantive patent law issues, the Supreme Court is unable to choose
between alternative doctrinal formulations developed by lower courts.225
Instead, if it rejects the Federal Circuit’s law, the Court must forge its own
new, untested formulation of patent law.226 Given the Court’s lack of
expertise, manipulation and error suggest that the Federal Circuit may be
better positioned to lead the development of substantive patent law.227
Thus, he suggests that “we abandon the vision of the Supreme Court as a
source of stability and finality” and instead use the Court to prevent
ossification of patent law by having the Court take patent cases in doctrinal
areas in which the Federal Circuit has either set forth law too quickly or
allowed it to remain untested for too long.228 In short, “[b]y periodically
taking on merits review in areas where Federal Circuit decisions may have
unduly ossified the law, the Supreme Court can help initiate escapes from
suboptimal legal equilibria.”229
Finally, Professor Peter Lee has focused his suggestions on
“methodological prescriptions to guide the [Supreme] Court during its
chosen interventions.”230 In particular, he has suggested that “the Supreme
Court should be aware of the ‘costly’ nature of broad standards and their
220

Id. at 688
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
222
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
223
Golden, supra note 11, at 693.
224
Id. at 693–94.
225
Id. at 700–01.
226
See id. at 701 (explaining that reviewing issues by different circuits allows the courts of
appeals to experiment with different rules and provide the Supreme Court with information and
options).
227
Id. at 704–05.
228
Id. at 701.
229
Id. at 720.
230
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 76.
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implications for patent adjudication by generalist judges.” Reflecting his
assessment of the effects of the formalistic tendencies of the Federal
Circuit, his proposal seeks to guide the Supreme Court “to retain the value
of a flexible, holistic approach to patent law while providing guidance to
district judges facing highly technical inquiries.”232
While these scholars have suggested ways in which the Supreme Court
might effectively police rule-based adjudication at the Federal Circuit—a
topic I will rejoin shortly—none of these scholars have comprehensively
analyzed the Supreme Court’s history of policing rule-based adjudication
at the Federal Circuit.233 I provide this analysis next.
B. The Supreme Court’s Policing of Rule-Based Adjudication in Patent
Law
This Section fills a void in the academic discourse by providing a
comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court’s history of policing the
Federal Circuit’s adoption of rule-based adjudication in patent cases over
the first three decades of the Federal Circuit’s existence. What this
analysis shows is that, until recently, the Supreme Court had not engaged
in any real effort to police any over-use of rule-based adjudication by the
Federal Circuit.
1. The First Decade: Indifference and Rules
In the first decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence,234 the Supreme
Court primarily showed indifference—some might say deferential
silence—toward the Federal Circuit’s stewardship of the nation’s patent
law.235
In the first case, Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,236 the
Supreme Court did not even review the merits of any issue of patent law
decided by the Federal Circuit. The Court primarily just asked the Federal
Circuit to explain the basis of its judgment reversing a district court’s
231

Id.
Id.
233
Professor Holbrook has addressed the Supreme Court’s role with respect to formalism in
patent law adjudication and, as a descriptive matter, concluded that the Supreme Court prefers to
implement procedural rules rather than alter substantive rules of patent law. Holbrook, The Supreme
Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 9.
234
The first decade spanned from October 1, 1982 to September 30, 1992. Harold C. Petrowitz,
Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982—and Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV.
543, 543 (1983).
235
See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 276–77 (“[N]eglecting the field—or, rather, neglecting the field even
more than it already had been—seemed to be the course that the Court was choosing during the first
decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, when the Court’s already low rate of granting certiorari in
patent cases declined even further.”).
236
475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam).
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obviousness determination.
In particular, the Court refused to consider,
without further analysis by the Federal Circuit, “the complex issue of the
degree to which the obviousness determination is one of fact” and
therefore the appropriate standard of review of an obviousness
determination on appeal.238 The Supreme Court did, however, include one
important comment, that subsidiary determinations of fact made by district
courts during an obviousness analysis are subject to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).239 As discussed above, this sentence may have led to
overuse of rule-based adjudication by the Federal Circuit in an effort to
circumscribe district court decision making.240
In the next case, Christianson v. Colt Industrial Operating Corp.,241
the Supreme Court likewise did not review the merits of any issue of
substantive patent law decided by the Federal Circuit.242 Nevertheless,
Christianson is notable because the Court resolved the disputed procedural
issue243 by applying a test that is more like a rule rather than a standard. In
particular, the Court held that the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction
should be measured by determining whether a substantial question of
patent law is a necessary element of one of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
claims.244 The Court rejected a more standard-like approach that would fix
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction by reference to the theories actually
presented to the court and jury.245 The Court thus adopted a test that could
be used ex ante by parties—at the pleading stage of litigation—to
determine whether an appeal would be within the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court justified its preferred test by indicating it
would create uniformity and reduce uncertainty.246
In the last case, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,247 the Supreme
237
See id. at 811 (“In the absence of an opinion clearly setting forth the views of the Court of
Appeals on these matters, we are not prepared to give plenary consideration to petitioner’s claim that
the decision below cannot be squared with Rule 52(a). Instead, we grant the petition for certiorari,
vacate the judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of
Rule 52(a).”).
238
Id.
239
See id. (“[W]hether or not the ultimate question of obviousness is a question of fact subject to
Rule 52(a), the subsidiary determinations of the District Court, at the least, ought to be subject to the
Rule.”).
240
See supra Part III.A.2.
241
486 U.S. 800 (1988).
242
See id. at 818 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, but
disapproving of the Federal Circuit’s decision to examine the merits of the case).
243
The Court resolved a “jurisdictional battle” between the Federal Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit, each of which “adamantly disavowed jurisdiction,” in favor of the Federal Circuit’s more
restrictive view of its jurisdiction. Id. at 803.
244
Id. at 808–09.
245
Id. at 813–14.
246
Id. at 813.
247
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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Court—eight years after the establishment of the Federal Circuit—finally
reached the merits of a disputed issue of substantive patent law.248 Again,
notably, the Court adopted a rule-like test rather than a standard.
Affirming the Federal Circuit, the Court held that a statutory exception to
infringement covers activities related, not just to drugs, but also to medical
devices.249 The Court based this ruling on the literal meaning of the statute
even though it found difficulty identifying normative reasons justifying the
scope of the exception.250 The Court pointed out that, had Congress sought
to limit the exception to drugs, Congress clearly could have done so using
different language.251 Moreover, by adopting an interpretation covering
both drugs and medical devices, the Court eliminated a more difficult linedrawing exercise.
Thus, in this first decade the Supreme Court did not act to reject rulebased adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication in patent law.
Moreover, the Court did not police any preference of the Federal Circuit
for rule-based adjudication. The Court reviewed only three patent cases
decided by the Federal Circuit during its first decade, and it adopted rulelike tests governing both procedural and substantive issues in the two cases
reaching the merits. Indeed, the Supreme Court effectively deferred to the
Federal Circuit on practically all matters the entire decade despite the
Federal Circuit’s resolution of significant patent law disputes and
application of rule-based adjudication.252
2. The Second Decade: Rules and Standards
In the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence,253 the Court
granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit and rendered opinions related to

248
See id. at 663–64 (outlining the issue of whether activities that normally constituted patent
infringement were non-infringing under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) if they were performed for the purpose
of submitting information for consideration by the FDA).
249
Id. at 674.
250
See id. at 668 (“[O]ne must admit that while the provision more naturally means what
respondent suggests, it is somewhat difficult to understand why anyone would want it to mean that.”);
see also id. at 669 (“As far as the text is concerned, therefore, we conclude that we have before us a
provision that somewhat more naturally reads as the Court of Appeals determined, but that is not
plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view . . . . We think the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is
confirmed, however, by the structure of the 1984 Act taken as a whole.”).
251
Id. at 667–68.
252
See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 876–77 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (requiring intent to deceive rather than merely gross negligence to find inequitable
conduct); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed
invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination.”).
253
The second decade spanned from October 1, 1992 to September 30, 2002. Petrowitz, supra
note 234, at 543.
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patent law in nine cases.
The tests the Court articulated in these nine
cases, unlike those articulated in the cases from the first decade of the
Federal Circuit’s existence, sometimes resembled standards.
a. Rule-Like Tests
In five of the nine cases, the Supreme Court articulated tests that
appear more like rules.255 The earliest example is Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.,256 where the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding
that courts rather than juries interpret terms in patent claims.257 The only
other option the Court considered, however, was another rule, that juries
interpret terms in patent claims.258 A later example is J.E.M. Ag Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,259 where the Court held that
newly developed plant breeds constitute eligible subject matter for
purposes of utility patents.260 In doing so, though, the Court merely upheld
the Federal Circuit’s decision to adopt this same bright-line rule.261
Similarly, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc.,262 the Supreme Court took a rule-based approach to the question of
254
I have excluded four patent cases where the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Federal Circuit but did not address any issue of patent law. See Talbert Fuel Sys.
Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 537 U.S. 802 (2002) (granting the writ of certiorari, vacating the Federal
Circuit’s judgment, and remanding the case to the Federal Circuit without reaching the merits); Nelson
v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 463 (2000) (reaching a holding related to due process requirements
and not patent law); Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 1111, 1111–12 (1997) (granting the
writ of certiorari, vacating the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanding the case to the Federal
Circuit without reaching the merits); Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
510 U.S. 27, 28 (1993) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). I have
also excluded a case that was not directed toward patent law, but rather to the Plant Variety Protection
Act. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995) (considering the question of
whether there is a limit to the quantity of protected, novel seed varieties a farmer can sell to other
farmers under an exemption to the Plant Variety Protection Act).
255
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002)
(applying a rule-based approach to the question of the appropriate scope of the statute governing the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127
(2001) (holding that newly created plant breeds are eligible to receive utility patent protection); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999) (holding
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its authority in enacting the Patent Remedy Act); Pfaff v. Wells
Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (adopting a two-part test governing the on-sale bar); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that courts, rather than juries, construe
patent claims).
256
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
257
Id. at 372.
258
Id. Professor Holbrook has noted that the Supreme Court’s focus in Markman on uniformity
and certainty “added support for the Federal Circuit’s preference for crystal rules.” Holbrook, The
Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 7.
259
534 U.S. 124.
260
Id. at 127.
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Id. at 145–46.
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the appropriate appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.263
Significantly, the Federal Circuit itself had adopted a rule, that an answer
with a compulsory counterclaim alleging patent infringement would cause
the Federal Circuit to have appellate jurisdiction.264 The Court held to the
contrary and, as a result, merely swapped one rule for another.265 Thus, out
of the five cases adopting rules, the Court’s holdings in the three cases
named above supply little evidence of a predilection for rules by
comparison to the Federal Circuit.
Next, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s totality-of-the-circumstances test governing the statutory on-sale
bar.266 As discussed above, the Federal Circuit adopted this test to govern
the question of whether an invention had been placed on sale in
circumstances where an idea had not been incorporated into something
built and tested.267 Notably, the Court indicated it was concerned that the
Federal Circuit’s test produced too much uncertainty.268 Indeed, given the
Federal Circuit’s test, inventors faced difficulty determining ex ante
whether they would be barred from obtaining patents on their inventions.269
Thus, in place of the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court adopted
its own two-part test that—at least relative to a totality-of-thecircumstances test—resembles a rule.270 The Court’s test requires (1) a
product to be “the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and (2) a related
invention that is “ready for patenting.”271 As Professor Holbrook
recognized, “the Court criticized the Federal Circuit for using a vague
standard and, in its place, articulated a more formalistic approach.”272
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the “ready for patenting”
prong of the Court’s test actually is standard-like, given its vague nature,
dependency on context, and subjectiveness. Thus, the Court’s approach
was only marginally more formalistic than the Federal Circuit’s approach,
at least in the sense of reflecting rule-based adjudication.
The fifth case is Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
263

Id. at 830.
See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 738−45
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over appeals from cases
involving no claim for infringement but instead a compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement),
overruled by Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), as
recognized in Telecomm Technical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc’ns, Inc., 295 F.3d 1249,
1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
265
Holmes Grp., Inc., 535 U.S. at 834.
266
See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (applying instead a two-part test).
267
See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
268
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
269
Thomas, supra note 16, at 778−79.
270
Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
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Id.
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Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 8.
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Board v. College Savings Bank, where the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity for patent infringement.274 The Court applied what appears to be
a rule that, absent proper abrogation of state sovereign immunity by
Congress, a state may not otherwise be sued for patent infringement unless
the state itself waives sovereign immunity.275 Given that waiver may be
constructive and not just express, however, the reality is that determining
whether a state has waived its sovereign immunity often is more akin to a
standard-based analysis.276 In short, like in Pfaff, the Court’s holding in
Florida Prepaid can hardly be labeled formalistic in the sense of favoring
rules over standards.
In sum, while each of these five cases involved the Supreme Court
establishing what appear to be rule-like tests governing legal issues, as
shown, two of the five tests involve at least some standard-like analyses.
Moreover, only in Pfaff did the Supreme Court reject the Federal Circuit’s
adoption of a standard—yet even in that case the Court adopted a test with
standard-like aspects.
b. Standard-Like Tests
In the remaining four patent cases, the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit and articulated legal tests more like standards rather than
rules.277 In the earliest, Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International,
Inc.,278 the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating and
dismissing as moot judgments of invalidity upon affirming judgments of
non-infringement.279 Relying on underlying policy considerations as well
as scholarly criticism, the Court rejected any per se rule of mootness in
favor of a standard that gives courts discretion to determine, based on the
circumstances of any particular case, whether an invalidity claim is moot
273

527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Id. at 630.
275
See id. at 647–48 (holding that Congress acted in excess of its authority when it invalidated
state sovereign immunity in cases of patent infringement).
276
See generally Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(conducting a waiver analysis and concluding that a state university waived its sovereign immunity by
initiating and actively participating in Patent Office proceedings).
277
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738−42 (2002)
(“[W]e have consistently applied the doctrine [of prosecution history estoppel] in a flexible way, not a
rigid one.”); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152−54 (1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit must
abide by the standard of review contained in the Administrative Procedure Act); Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6 (1997) (refusing to apply a more rigid rule for
prosecution history estoppel); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 99−103 (1993)
(rejecting the Federal Circuit’s practice of vacating and dismissing judgments on claims of invalidity
whenever it affirmed judgments of non-infringement, but recognizing continued discretion whether to
exercise existing jurisdiction).
278
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
279
Id. at 102.
274
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after a holding of non-infringement.
Later, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,281 the
Court similarly rejected a bright-line rule in favor of a flexible standard,
this one related to the doctrine of equivalents.282 Rather than establish a
rule that any amendment to a patent claim eliminates the ability to rely
upon the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement, the Court held that
a court must “probe[] the reasoning behind the Patent Office’s insistence
upon a change in the claims” and may prohibit a patentee from relying on
the doctrine of equivalents only if the patentee is unable to establish a
purpose unrelated to the requirements of patentability.283 Poignantly, the
Court noted that it saw no reason to adopt a “rigid rule” governing the
relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of
equivalents, even if it could provide a brighter line and therefore more
certainty and reviewability in this area of patent law.284 In this regard,
however, the Supreme Court’s holding was actually consistent with the
holding of the Federal Circuit, which explicitly required inquiry into the
reasons for an amendment.285
Next, in Dickinson v. Zurko, as discussed above, the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s view that it should apply the “clearly
erroneous” standard when it reviews findings of fact made by the Patent
Office.286 Instead, the Court concluded that judges must apply the less
strict standard articulated in the Administrative Procedure Act, which
requires a reviewing court to set aside an agency finding found to be

280
Id. at 99−103. The court expressly recognized that the Federal Circuit had adopted a “uniform
practice or rule.” Id. at 92 n.12.
281
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
282
Id. at 32 & n.6.
283
Id. at 31, 40−41.
284
See id. at 32 (“[W]e see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an
estoppel regardless of the reasons for a change [to claim language].”); id. at 32 n.6 (“That petitioner’s
rule might provide a brighter line for determining whether a patentee is estopped under certain
circumstances is not a sufficient reason for adopting such a rule.”); id. at 39 n.8 (“We leave it to the
Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote certainty, consistency, and
reviewability to this area of the law.”). Professor Holbrook ultimately concludes that the reasoning the
Court used to adopt the all elements rule and the rebuttable presumption with respect to prosecution
history—certainty and public notice—“perhaps further embolden[ed] the Federal Circuit’s efforts” to
create bright line rules. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 8. To the extent
it did embolden the Federal Circuit, however, the Federal Circuit would have had to ignore the Court’s
explicit rejection of a “rigid rule” governing the relationship between prosecution history estoppel and
the doctrine of equivalents.
285
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Whenever prosecution history estoppel is invoked as a limitation to infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, ‘a close examination must be made as to, not only what was surrendered, but also the
reason for such a surrender.’” (quoting Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d
698, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990))), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
286
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152−54 (1999).
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“unsupported by substantial evidence.”
As a result of this decision,
courts effectively must give more deference to factual determinations made
by the Patent Office.288
Finally, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,289
the Court held that the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is a
flexible, not a complete, bar to the doctrine of equivalents.290 Because the
Court focused on the flexibility of the standard it articulated and criticized
the rigidity of the Federal Circuit’s complete bar approach,291 Festo is a
favorite example for those who claim the Supreme Court takes a less
formalistic view of patent law compared to the Federal Circuit.292
Nevertheless, as Professor Thomas has recognized, the law the Supreme
Court articulated “in fact fell far short of returning to a ‘flexible bar’
standard” and thus “largely vindicates increasingly restrictive Federal
Circuit practices regarding the doctrine of equivalents.”293
When analyzing the Supreme Court’s four patent cases adopting
standards during the Federal Circuit’s second decade, it is important to
recognize that the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s use of a
rule-like test in favor of a standard-like test in only two of the cases—
Cardinal Chemical and Festo.
***
In summary, in the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence,
the Supreme Court adopted rule-like tests in five cases and standard-like
tests in four. Moreover, of the five cases adopting rule-like tests, two
ultimately allowed for some standard-based adjudication based on the
resulting, underlying legal determinations.294 On the other hand, while the
Court rejected bright-line rules embraced by the Federal Circuit in favor of
287

Id. at 152−53 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994)).
Here the Supreme Court rejected an instance of patent law exceptionalism: the idea that patent
law may be, or even should be, unique. I return to this topic below in the context of rule-based versus
standard-based adjudication. See infra Part V.A.1.d. For more recent examples of the Court’s
skepticism of patent law exceptionalism, see MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007),
and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), where the Court was “interested in
conforming patent law to broader legal doctrines and principles.” Lee, Patent Law and the Two
Cultures, supra note 16, at 77–78. For a fundamental examination of the assumptions underlying
patent law exceptionalism and its resulting problems, see Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from
Industrial Policy to Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1169−76 (2012).
289
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
290
Id. at 738−42.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Rai, supra note 16, at 1120−21 (citing Festo as an example of a case where the
Supreme Court applied a more flexible standard compared to a rule used by the Federal Circuit).
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Thomas, supra note 16, at 786.
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flexible standards in Cardinal Chemical and Festo, the Court did the
opposite in Pfaff. Thus, the Supreme Court’s second decade of review,
like the first decade, does not reflect the Supreme Court taking a vigorous
stand rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based
adjudication, but instead indicates an openness to rule-based and standardbased adjudication in appropriate circumstances. Nevertheless, compared
to the first decade, the second decade represented a shift at the Supreme
Court toward standards and against rules in patent cases. Conversely,
“[d]uring the second decade of the Federal Circuit’s existence, patent
jurisprudence [at the Federal Circuit] ha[d] become increasingly oriented
towards simple rules.”295
3. The Third Decade: An Emerging Systemic Preference for
Standards
While scholars labeled the Federal Circuit as a formalist court at the
beginning of its third decade of existence,296 the Supreme Court did not
earn its reputation for rejecting rules in favor of standards in patent cases
until later that decade. By the conclusion of the decade, the Court had
granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit and rendered opinions related to
patent law in fourteen cases.297 In ten of the fourteen cases, the Court
adopted a standard-like test.
a. Rule-Like Tests
First consider the four cases adopting rule-like tests.298 In the earliest
case, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,299 the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of the statute governing infringement
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Thomas, supra note 16, at 778.
The third decade was between October 1, 2002 and September 30, 2012. Petrowitz, supra note
234, at 543. By 2003, Professors Holbrook, Rai, and Thomas had labeled the Federal Circuit as a
formalist court. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity, supra note 16, at 2−3; Rai, supra note 16,
at 1114; Thomas, supra note 16, at 777.
297
I have excluded three patent cases from my count. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009) (resolving a non-patent law issue); Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548
U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc.
v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 397–99 (2006) (resolving a non-patent law issue).
298
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1675 (2012) (holding that a
generic manufacturer sued for patent infringement may counterclaim challenging the accuracy of the
description that the brand name manufacturer submitted to the FDA); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131
S. Ct. 2238, 2250−52 (2011) (holding that clear and convincing evidence is always required to
invalidate a patent); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188, 2192 (2011) (holding that title to federally funded inventions vests in inventors rather than in
federal contractors); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 447−59 (2007) (requiring a copy
of software supplied from the United States to be combined abroad to form the patented invention for
liability to attach under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
299
550 U.S. 437 (2007).
296
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by exportation.
Based on policy concerns related to the ease of copying
software, the Federal Circuit had developed a standard-like test, which in
effect meant that sending a single copy of software abroad with the intent
that it be replicated abroad invoked liability for each foreign-made copy.301
Unlike the Federal Circuit, the Court was unwilling to let policy justify
outcome; it adopted a rule-based test, which considers a copy of software
to have been supplied from the United States only when that copy is
“combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.”302 The Court
bluntly rejected the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that policy should direct
statutory interpretation.303 Ultimately, the Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s standard-like test because it did not find any support in the
relevant statute, because of its concern with extraterritoriality, and because
it did not view its role as one of dynamically interpreting the relevant
statute based on policy-oriented concerns.304
In the next case, Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.,305 the Court held that a statute
does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal
contractors.306 Instead, federal contractors must obtain assignments from
inventors.307 Note that while the Court adopted a rule governing the
disputed issue, both parties presented competing rules for the Court to
adopt, essentially whether or not rights to inventions automatically vest in
federal contractors.308 Moreover, the Court ultimately agreed with the
Federal Circuit’s rule on point, that ownership of inventions automatically
vests in inventors.309
In the third case, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.,310 the Court concluded
that clear and convincing evidence is required to invalidate a patent.311
Rather than allow consideration of functional reasons why a lesser amount
of evidence might be appropriate in a particular situation—and there are

300

Id. at 447−59.
Id. at 452.
302
Id. at 453.
303
See id. at 457 (“[W]e are not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of [the relevant
statutory subsection] is in order.”).
304
Id. at 452−58.
305
131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
306
Id. at 2192.
307
Id. at 2195–99.
308
See id. (describing and rejecting the petitioner’s reading of the statute).
309
In this case the Supreme Court recognized a principle of patent law exceptionalism. In the
words of the court, “it is often the case that whatever an employee produces in the course of his
employment belongs to his employer” but “patent law has always been different.” Id. at 2196. Below I
address patent law exceptionalism as a basis to support rule-based adjudication. See infra Part V.A.1.d.
310
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
311
Id. at 2242.
301
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312

many such reasons —the Court decided that clear and convincing
evidence is always required.313 Other than the statutory text, the Court’s
primary reason for holding that clear and convincing evidence is always
required was its own precedent314 and the fact that, for nearly thirty years,
the Federal Circuit had applied the same rule requiring clear and
convincing evidence.315
In Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk,316 the
Supreme Court held that a generic manufacturer sued for patent
infringement by a brand manufacturer may file a counterclaim challenging
the accuracy of a description, submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) by the brand manufacturer, of the scope of the
asserted patent.317 The Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision to the
contrary based on the context of the relevant statute.318 Thus, the Court
replaced a bright-line rule (a generic manufacturer is not allowed to file a
counterclaim seeking to correct an inaccurate description) with another
bright-line rule (a generic manufacturer is allowed to file such a
counterclaim).
Thus, in only one of these four cases adopting a rule did the Supreme
Court reject a standard adopted by the Federal Circuit, but in that case the
Supreme Court rejected policy-based justifications for that standard.
Moreover, in two of these cases the Supreme Court adopted the very same
rule used by the Federal Circuit.
b. Standard-Like Tests
Now, consider the ten cases from the third decade of the Federal
Circuit’s existence where the Court adopted standard-like tests.319 The
312
See David O. Taylor, Clear but Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit’s Invalidity Standard, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 293, 312–18 (2011) (identifying reasons why a
preponderance standard of proof may be appropriate in some circumstances).
313
See i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2250–52 (“[T]he challenger[] [has the] burden to persuade the jury of
its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”).
314
See id. at 2245 (stating that the decision in Radio Corporation of America v. Radio
Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934), “is authoritative”).
315
Id. at 2243, 2251.
316
132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
317
Id. at 1675.
318
See id. at 1681–84 (“The statutory scheme . . . contemplates that one patented use will not
foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones. Within that framework, the counterclaim
naturally functions to challenge the brand’s assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the
generic company wishes to pursue.”).
319
See Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012) (holding inter alia that a district court has
broad discretion over the weight given to new evidence introduced in a civil action challenging the
Patent Office’s decision to reject a patent application); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (holding that patent claims must include an “inventive concept” not
to be preempted by the prohibition against patents on natural laws); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011) (adopting a standard for inducement of infringement that
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320

earliest example is Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., in which
the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of a statutory
safe harbor provision that makes certain experimental conduct noninfringing activity.321 In particular, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
rule limiting the statutory safe harbor to uses of patented inventions that
result in a submission of information to the FDA. Instead, the Court
interpreted the safe harbor broadly to cover uses of patented inventions
where there was a reasonable basis to believe that the uses would produce
types of information that are relevant to the FDA.322 In this way, the Court
built its test upon the classic standard of reasonableness.
Next, consider Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.323 In
this case, the Court concluded that the existence of a patent on a tying
product does not create a presumption of market power for purposes of an
allegation of an antitrust violation for illegal tying.324 Instead, the party
alleging an antitrust violation must prove that the patent owner has market
power.325 Thus, the Court replaced a rule (a presumption of market power)
and its underlying standard (a patentee may overcome the presumption by
showing that it does not have market power), with just a standard (the
antitrust claimant must show that the patentee has market power).
Significantly, however, the Federal Circuit derived the presumption of
market power from Supreme Court precedent.326 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s replacement of a rule with a standard in this case speaks little
regarding any policing of the Federal Circuit’s preference for rules.
permits a finding of actual knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the machine-ortransformation test is the exclusive test for determining patent eligibility); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008) (finding that exhaustion applies to method patents and a license
authorizing the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in suit); KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s TSM test in favor of an
“expansive and flexible approach” to the question of non-obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (indicating that courts should determine whether the alleged
facts suggest that a controversy is real, immediate, and significant before finding declaratory judgment
jurisdiction); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (outlining a four-factor test
to determine whether to grant injunctive relief); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
45–46 (2006) (holding that there is no presumption of market power even when there is a patent for
purposes of an allegation of antitrust liability for illegal tying); Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005) (favoring a broad interpretation of non-infringement statutory safe
harbor).
320
545 U.S. 193.
321
See id. at 205–08 (“[T]o construe [the statutory provision] as the Court of Appeals did . . . is
effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic
drug. . . . The statutory text does not require such a result.”).
322
Id. at 207.
323
547 U.S. 28.
324
Id. at 31.
325
Id. at 46.
326
See id. at 33 (describing the Federal Circuit’s adherence to Supreme Court precedent).
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Another case in which the Supreme Court overturned the Federal
Circuit’s use of a rule in favor of a standard is eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.327 In this case, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s use of a
“general rule” that injunctive relief follows an adjudication of
infringement.328 The Court held that there is no presumption in favor of
injunctive relief, and instead courts must apply what the Court deemed to
be equity’s traditional four-factor test.329 This test requires the patentee to
demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships . . . a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.330
While the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” was a classic rule-like shortcut,
the Court’s four-factor test is a classic standard.
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,331 the Supreme Court yet again
rejected a rule developed by the Federal Circuit in favor of a standard.332
In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the Court determined that it would not
require termination or breach of license agreements before licensees would
be permitted to request declarations that the licensed patents were invalid,
not infringed, or unenforceable.333 Rather, the Court articulated a standard
for determining whether a licensee could establish declaratory judgment
jurisdiction—“whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment”334—that, as the Court itself conceded, does “not
draw the brightest of lines.”335
The Supreme Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,336
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of a rule in favor of a
standard-like approach. The Federal Circuit’s rule required a party
alleging obviousness of a claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) to
327

547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Id. at 390–91.
329
Id. at 391.
330
Id.
331
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
332
See id. at 135 (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s application of the common-law rule providing
that a contracting party “cannot at one and the same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its
benefits”).
333
Id. at 137.
334
Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
335
Id.
336
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
328
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satisfy the TSM test.
The Court did not mince words in rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s application of its test as a “rigid approach” contrary to the
“expansive and flexible approach” to obviousness reflected in the Court’s
precedent.338 Indeed, even after recognizing that “it can be important to
identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new
invention does,” the Court criticized the Federal Circuit for converting a
“helpful insight” into a “rigid and mandatory formula[].”339 Moreover, the
Court indicated that the “obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a
formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation.”340 Instead, the Court favored a “functional approach” that
involves “a broad inquiry”341 including consideration of various
“secondary considerations,” such as “commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, [and] failure of others.”342
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,343 the Supreme
Court rejected another bright-line rule adopted by the Federal Circuit, that
method patents as a category are not subject to the exhaustion doctrine.344
In place of this bright-line rule, the Court articulated a framework for
determining whether exhaustion applies to a method patent by examining
whether components substantially embodying the method in question were
the subject of a sale authorized by the patentee.345 The first portion of this
test, whether components substantially embody the method patent in
question, is standard-like, particularly when compared to the categorical
approach of the Federal Circuit.
The Supreme Court, in Bilski v. Kappos,346 yet again rejected a rulebased test adopted by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit had
concluded that the “machine-or-transformation” test was the exclusive test
for determining patent eligibility with respect to processes.347 The Court
rejected this test in no uncertain terms as being too categorical: “Rather
than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and
unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of
337

Id. at 407.
Id. at 415.
339
Id. at 418–19. The Court would add that “when a court transforms the general principle into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.” Id. at 419.
Similarly, the Court stated that “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common
sense . . . are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. at 421.
340
Id. at 419.
341
Id. at 415.
342
Id. at 406 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
343
553 U.S. 617 (2008).
344
Id. at 621.
345
Id. at 621, 638.
346
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
347
Id. at 3226.
338
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this Court’s [precedent showing] that petitioners’ claims are not patentable
processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.”348 But the
Court was not able to provide direction—other than to consult its
precedent—to answer the question of what exactly qualifies as an abstract
idea.349 As a result, the Court left the issue of whether an inventor has
attempted to patent an abstract idea as a standard-based inquiry without
any test, let alone a bright-line rule, governing the analysis.350
In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,351 the Supreme Court
decided that active inducement of infringement requires that the inducing
party know that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.352
Moreover, it rejected the Federal Circuit’s formulation of the test
governing the minimum required knowledge.353
In place of the
requirement to show a deliberate disregard of a known risk, the Court
adopted a standard consistent with criminal law that permits a finding of
actual knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness.354 Thus, while
adopting a standard, the Court here merely supplanted the Federal Circuit’s
use of a different standard.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent eligibility of processes
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.355 As in
Bilski, the Court applied a test more like a standard than the machine-ortransformation test applied by the Federal Circuit.356 Here, the Court
addressed the patent eligibility exception for natural laws. The Court
concluded that patents may not be granted to protect “processes that too
348
Id. at 3229–30. Notably, the Court also rejected another categorical rule, albeit one not
adopted by the Federal Circuit, which would have made all business methods ineligible for patenting.
Id. at 3228.
349
See id. at 3229–31 (“The Court . . . need not define further what constitutes a patentable
‘process,’ beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in § 100(b) and looking to the
guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Dierh.”).
350
See id. at 3234–36 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying
account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does not even explain if it
is using the machine-or-transformation criteria. The Court essentially asserts its conclusion that
petitioners’ application claims an abstract idea.”); Duffy, supra note 20, at 1277 (“The Supreme
Court’s opinion in Bilski seems to permit . . . a standards-based approach, which relies on multiple
criteria in deciding issues of patentable subject matter . . . .”).
351
131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
352
Id. at 2068.
353
Id. at 2068–71.
354
See id. at 2070–71 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals . . . all appear to agree on two basic
requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact
exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. . . . Under this
formulation, a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.”).
355
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
356
See id. at 1296 (“[T]he ‘machine or transformation test’ is not a definitive test of patent
eligibility, but only an important and useful clue.” (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3234–35
(2010))).
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357

broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”
According to the Court, “a
process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other
elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts
to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”358 And if
use of the terms “too broadly” and “significantly more” did not already
highlight the standard-like form of the inquiry, the Court made it plainly
evident in describing its test: “The question before us is whether the claims
do significantly more than simply describe [natural relationships]. To put
the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their
statements of the [relationships] to allow the processes they describe to
qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”359 As if to
confirm the standard-like form of this inquiry, the Court conceded that “the
underlying functional concern here is a relative one: how much future
innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the inventor.”360
In the last patent case of the third decade, Kappos v. Hyatt,361 the Court
considered two questions: (1) whether there are any restrictions on the
ability of a losing patent applicant to introduce new evidence in a district
court proceeding challenging a rejection of a patent application by the
Patent Office; and (2) the standard of review that a district court must use
when considering any such new evidence.362 On both questions, the Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit. Applicants may introduce new evidence
subject only to the rules applicable to all civil actions (the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Civil Procedure),363 and the appropriate standard of review is
357

Id. at 1294.
Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
359
Id. at 1297.
360
Id. at 1303. Interestingly, the Supreme Court attempted to justify the fact that its test did not
distinguish among different laws of nature by pointing out that:
358

Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of
judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature. And so the cases
have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature,
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily
administered proxy for the underlying [policy] concern.
Id. The Supreme Court’s overall test is hardly a bright-line prohibition even if it is more of a bright
line compared to an alternative. Anyway, it was the patentee, not the Federal Circuit, who proposed a
test distinguishing between laws of nature based on whether they interfere significantly with innovation
in other fields. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s test can hardly be characterized as a “bright-line
prohibition” compared to the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, rejected in Bilski.
Regardless, the Court’s adoption of what it considered to be a more rule-like test based on the inability
of a decision-maker to make a well-informed judgment is the type of analysis that I suggest courts use
with respect to questions of rule-based adjudication in patent law. See infra Part V.A.2.
361
132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012).
362
Id. at 1694.
363
Id. at 1700.
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364

de novo. The Court also held, consistent with Federal Circuit precedent,
that the district court has broad discretion over the weight to be given new
evidence.365 In this last respect, the Court affirmed an approach more
consistent with a standard than a rule, but again this standard had already
been developed by the Federal Circuit.366
In these ten cases adopting standards, the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s use of rules in a remarkable number of cases, seven. And
in doing so, it repeatedly criticized the Federal Circuit for being too rigid
and categorical.
***
In summary, the Supreme Court appears to have earned its reputation
for rejecting rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based
adjudication during its third decade of review of Federal Circuit patent
decisions. While four cases adopted rule-like tests, the Supreme Court
rejected a standard adopted by the Federal Circuit only once. By contrast,
the Court adopted standard-like tests in ten cases, and in seven of those
cases the Court rejected rule-like tests adopted by the Federal Circuit.367
4. Conclusions
While others designated the Federal Circuit as a formalist court at the
beginning of its third decade based on a purported tendency to adopt rulebased adjudication in patent cases too often, until now no one has provided
a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which the Supreme Court has
favored rules or standards or policed any such tendency of the Federal
Circuit. That analysis, conducted over the Federal Circuit’s entire
existence, shows that the Supreme Court has rejected a standard-like test
adopted by the Federal Circuit in a patent case and replaced it with a more
rule-like test only twice, while it has done the opposite eight times.
Moreover, in the thirty-plus years of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the
364

Id.
Id.
366
Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
367
As of this writing, we are only a year into the fourth decade, which spans from October 1,
2012 to September 30, 2022, Petrowitz, supra note 234, at 543, and the Supreme Court has ruled in
only two patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit. In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Court affirmed
the Federal Circuit’s holding that a patent owner does not completely exhaust its patent rights by
selling patented seeds. 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013). The Court’s decision rested on a rule-like
premise, that the exhaustion doctrine does not eliminate the right to prohibit another from making a
new product. Id. at 1766–67. In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Federal Circuit, ultimately concluding
that cDNA is patent eligible but isolated DNA segments are not. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). To
distinguish between the two types of DNA, the Court, like the Federal Circuit, applied the “rule against
patents on naturally occurring things.” Id. at 2116. Thus, in both cases, the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court have applied the same rule-like tests.
365
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Supreme Court has increasingly rejected rules in favor of standards in
patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit, particularly in the third decade
of the Federal Circuit’s existence. In short, the Supreme Court has grown
more likely to detect and correct formalistic rule-based adjudication at the
Federal Circuit. Thus, from an overall perspective, the Court might, as a
descriptive matter, be seen as policing the tendency of the Federal Circuit
to engage in rule-based adjudication.
Some, however, might argue that the Federal Circuit’s persistence in
adopting rule-based adjudication in patent cases, and the Supreme Court’s
repeated rejection of that form of adjudication, indicates that the patent
system is broken. That is, some might argue that the Federal Circuit has
not “gotten the message” that rule-based adjudication is inappropriate. I
will now consider whether there is an appropriate equilibrium between
rule-based adjudication and standard-based adjudication in patent law, as
well as whether the Supreme Court’s increasing suggestions that the
Federal Circuit has improperly invoked bright-line rules368 actually reflects
the proper functioning of the present institutional system. Indeed, several
normative questions remain, including whether patent law should favor
rule-based adjudication; whether the Federal Circuit should adopt rule-like
tests in particular matters of patent law; whether the Supreme Court should
police the Federal Circuit’s apparent preference for rule-like tests and, if
so, how it should carry out such policing; and whether the role of the
Federal Circuit should change based on any such policing by the Supreme
Court. I address these normative questions next.
V. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES IN PATENT LAW ADJUDICATION
Given that the real question that deserves attention is “what degree of
formalism?,” rather than “formalist or not?,”369 it is surprising that most
academic discourse to date on the topic of formalism and patent law has
addressed only the latter question, reached the same conclusion that the
Federal Circuit is formalist based on its preference for rules, and then—for
those that have even reached the normative aspect of the latter
question370—concluded that this is bad and proposed ways to reform the
institutional structure and the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent cases.371
There has not yet been extensive academic discourse on the former
question, particularly from the normative perspective, as applied to patent
368
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(rejecting a bright line rule adopted by the Federal Circuit).
369
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 640.
370
Professor Lee largely avoided normative positions in his article addressing the general issue of
formalism in patent law adjudication. See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 25
(“My aim is not to assess these mechanisms normatively so much as it is to describe them.”).
371
See supra Part IV.A (discussing relevant scholarship).

466

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:415

law: What degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law adjudication is
appropriate?372 Moreover, as discussed above, academic discourse also has
largely avoided extensive consideration of the responsibility of the
Supreme Court—not just the Federal Circuit—with respect to rule-based
adjudication in patent law.
To fill this gap in legal scholarship, I begin, in this Part, to address the
question of what degree of rule-based adjudication in patent law may be
appropriate by engaging in two related inquiries. First, what are the
policies that may favor rule-based adjudication in patent law, and, given
these policies, in what areas of patent law should rule-based adjudication
be considered as potentially more appropriate? Inherent in this first
inquiry is the merit of patent law exceptionalism as applied to rule-based
adjudication—to what extent should patent law include more rules than
other areas of law? Second, to the extent that rule-based adjudication in
patent law may be appropriate generally or as applied to particular areas of
patent law, how should the Federal Circuit approach specific questions
concerning the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication, particularly
given its existence as a semi-specialized appellate court whose decisions
are reviewed by a generalized court of last resort? And, conversely, how
should the Supreme Court, as a generalized court of last resort, review
decisions by a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court when
considering matters of rule-based adjudication? By engaging in these
inquiries, this Part evaluates the institutional roles of the Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court in the development of patent law, with particular
attention to the potential normative basis for rule-based adjudication in
patent law. And this Part ultimately identifies a general framework with
particular practices that the respective courts should adopt to fulfill their
proper institutional roles within the current institutional structure.
A. The Normative Basis for Rule-Based Adjudication in Patent Law
What degree of rule-based adjudication is appropriate for legal issues
372
Professor Kumar, for example, has indicated that “it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit has
acted improperly” by preferring rules to standards, when rules “decrease uncertainty and prevent
repeated litigation on the same issues.” Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229,
278 (2013). Professor Dreyfuss is one of the scholars to focus on this normative question. On the one
hand, she has explained that there are reasons to think that precision in patent law is “more important in
some respects” than accuracy. Dreyfuss, supra note 93, at 13. On the other hand, she has also
indicated that the Federal Circuit has gone too far in favoring precision over accuracy. See Dreyfuss,
supra note 9, at 800 (“[T]he problems with the Federal Circuit appear to be largely related to the
question of accuracy.”). Most recently, Professor Mullally proposed a framework to evaluate the need
for certainty in patent law generally. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and
Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1146–59 (2010). She advocates the following “simple
guideposts for addressing uncertainty: identifying with as much precision as possible the primary
institution or actor responsible for the uncertainty; assessing different types of uncertainty; and lastly,
taking into account the importance of other, countervailing values.” Id. at 1146–47.
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that arise in patent law? To answer this question it is important to identify
and study the policies that might favor rule-based adjudication. While the
general advantages of rule-based adjudication are discussed in detail
above, judges and commentators routinely identify one overarching policy
supporting rule-based adjudication in patent law: certainty. For purposes
of this analysis, certainty incorporates the concepts of clarity (the ability to
understand the controlling law) and predictability (the ability to predict the
application of the controlling law).373 There are various reasons that
certainty should be considered as a possible justification for rule-based
adjudication in patent law. And, taken together, these reasons should drive
the application of the policy of certainty to the ultimate jurisprudential
question of whether particular patent law doctrines deserve rule-like tests.
1. Certainty
Consider the four primary legal and policy-based justifications for
emphasizing certainty in patent law adjudication: the Federal Courts
Improvement Act, general principles of law, the Constitution, and what I
will refer to as patent law exceptionalism.
a. The Federal Courts Improvement Act
One source for the importance of certainty in patent law is the
normative basis for the creation of the Federal Circuit, as reflected in the
legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act.374 That
legislative history indicates proponents of the Federal Circuit sought to
strengthen the U.S. patent system, foster technological growth and
industrial innovation, eliminate forum shopping among regional courts of
appeal, and increase uniformity and reduce uncertainty in substantive
patent law.375 Significantly, one might think that the latter reasons—
increasing uniformity and decreasing uncertainty—justify, not just the
formation of the Federal Circuit, but also more generally rule-based
adjudication in patent cases. Judge Newman, for example, has invoked the
Federal Circuit’s “assignment” and “role” of creating uniformity and
certainty as a reason to favor “sharpened principles” and to create “stable
and comprehensible” tests in patent law.376 Similarly, commentators have
373
See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994) (describing clarity and
predictability as important to patent law).
374
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
375
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20, 23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 29 (1981).
376
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“This court has sharpened the principles of claim construction, in fulfilling
its assignment to bring national uniformity to patent principles.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
251 F.3d 955, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In this period of unprecedented
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pointed to the legislative history behind the formation of the Federal
Circuit as an explanation for the judges’ invocation of rule-based tests in
patent law.377
There is a good argument, however, that—technically—this may be a
misapplication of the legislative history. The discussion of the desire for
more certainty in patent law, in context, referred to a reason for formation
of the Federal Circuit. In particular, proponents of the Federal Circuit
desired to create a circuit court with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in
patent cases because they wanted to eliminate circuit splits regarding
patent law issues, which would give certainty to potential litigants based on
uniformity of interpretation and application of patent law principles.
Significantly, the creation and therefore existence of a single circuit court
with exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases
necessarily achieves that result.378 The Federal Circuit, so the thought
went,379 as the only intermediate appellate court interpreting and applying
development of patent-supported biological advance, the nation needs a stable and comprehensible
patent law, lest this court falter in its leading role in implementing the law’s fundamental purposes.”).
Judge O’Malley likewise has indicated that “[t]he uniformity Congress hoped we would bring to the
patent system is uniformity born of our own adjudicative function.” Kathleen M. O’Malley, An
Expanded “Slim Volume” on the Limited Role of Courts in Shaping Patent Policy, 22 FED. CIR. B.J.
91, 98 (2012) (emphasis added).
377
See, e.g., David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 682 (2013) (“Bright-line rules are
predictable and much easier to apply consistently—whether horizontally or vertically—than standards.
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s actual and perceived special mandate [which the authors derive from the
legislative history associated with the court’s formation] seems to have some power in explaining its
preference for bright-line rules.”). In explaining a perceived preference for rule-based adjudication,
Professor Dreyfuss highlights the legislative history surrounding the formation of the court and its
emphasis on predictability, the desire of its early judges to gain acceptance and permanence by
emphasizing predictability, and the unique nature of the Federal Circuit judges and their background—
less drawn from academics and district courts and more with backgrounds tied to legislation. Dreyfuss,
supra note 9, at 814–22.
378
See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013) (“Congress ensured . . . uniformity by
vesting exclusive jurisdiction over . . . patent cases in the federal district courts and exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.”); Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now that It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 735 (2004) (“[T]he
goal of uniformity was achieved procedurally not by years of decisions but by a single act of Congress
in granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.”); Pauline Newman, The
Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 513, 524 (1992) (“A principal goal [of
those who formed the Federal Circuit], the elimination of intercircuit differences, was achieved
overnight, for after October 1, 1982 there was no other forum.”).
379
The Federal Courts Improvement Act did not succeed in vesting the Federal Circuit with
exclusive jurisdiction over all patent cases. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over cases
where a patent infringement claim was brought only as a counterclaim). In 2011, however, Congress
amended the relevant statute to ensure that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent
infringement cases. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284,
331–32 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012)) (extending the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction
to all cases involving compulsory counterclaims of patent infringement).
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patent law, would inherently create uniformity because no other
intermediate appellate court would interpret and apply patent law. The
court would be able to create one body of precedent rather than twelve
created by the regional circuits in the absence of Supreme Court
oversight.380 And this uniformity of precedent would necessarily increase
certainty. Moreover, the court ultimately would be able to create that
precedent on the vast array of issues that arise in all patent cases, not just
patent cases that happen to reach one regional appellate court, again
increasing certainty with respect to substantive patent law.381
The discussion of certainty in the legislative history did not clearly
refer to the Federal Circuit’s adjudicatory approach. That is, proponents
of the formation of the Federal Circuit did not stress that the new court
should seek to attain a higher level of certainty in patent law by the type of
legal tests the court articulated in patent cases. Thus, the idea that
Congress sought to further certainty in patent law through the Federal
Circuit’s adjudicative approach to patent cases may be a misconception.
Nevertheless, the ability of the Federal Circuit to hear a larger volume
of cases focused on patent law may as a practical matter result in increased
rule-based adjudication. Given its relatively large volume of patent cases,
Federal Circuit judges may feel inclined to make finer and finer
distinctions in different circumstances, with the result that patent law
becomes more defined and, in that sense, more rule-based. Or perhaps
380
In the first opinion issued by the Federal Circuit, Chief Judge Markey, on behalf of the en banc
court, stated: “As a court of nationwide geographic jurisdiction, [the Federal Circuit was] created and
chartered with the hope and intent that stability and uniformity would be achieved in all fields of law
within its substantive jurisdiction.” S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (emphases added); see also Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Challenge and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 595 (1985) [hereinafter Markey, Challenge and
Opportunity] (“The challenge to the court and its bar is to create and maintain a uniform, reliable,
predictable, nationally-applicable body of law in each of the many and varied fields of substantive law
assigned exclusively to the court.” (emphasis added)). Thus, some Federal Circuit judges may have
viewed the court’s creation as insufficient to create the stability and uniformity sought by Congress.
Indeed, on the Federal Circuit’s tenth anniversary, Chief Judge Markey declared that “the Federal
Circuit met the desire of its congressional creators for increased uniformity” by identifying and
resolving “all of the thirteen conflicts in the previous patent law decisions of the regional circuit courts
and remov[ing] the slogans that for years had barnacled the patent law.” Howard T. Markey, The
Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (1992).
381
This legislative history, and its emphasis on uniformity, is particularly relevant to procedural
questions that have arisen related to the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and similar doctrines
affecting the choice of law. See generally Holmes Grp., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (addressing the
scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (addressing state sovereign immunity from federal patent law); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (addressing federal preemption of a state
statute); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (addressing the scope of the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction). But increased procedural uniformity—in terms of consolidating
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases and creating a unitary set of precedent governing patent law—
inherently increases certainty in substantive patent law.
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based on the large volume of cases, Federal Circuit judges may feel
inclined to create more bright-line rules based on a sense that these rules
would make patent litigation more efficient; they may decide that, based on
their experience, the vast majority of cases will be decided correctly when
applying those rules. Thus, rule-based adjudication may be a natural result
of increased exposure to any area of law, including patent law.
Regardless, certainty is not irrelevant as a potential normative guide to
the development of patent law doctrine. Far from it. Consider Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., where the Supreme Court determined that
vesting judges rather than juries with responsibility for claim construction
would “promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty
through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject
to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals
court.”382 In this way the Court distinguished between interjurisdictional
uniformity (achieved by the creation of the Federal Circuit with its
virtually-exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases)383 and intrajurisdictional
certainty (understood to mean predictability obtained through consistent
application of judicial precedent). Notably, this justification for the
Court’s holding, intrajurisdictional certainty, derives not from the
legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act but from a
general principle of law (stare decisis) applied in a patent case.
Nevertheless, the Court adopted a particular bright-line rule in the context
of an important issue in patent law adjudication—judges would interpret
patent claims—based in part on the idea of increasing certainty, a goal that
just so happens to be included expressly in the Federal Courts
Improvement Act as a justification for the creation of the Federal Circuit.
Markman thus provides a good example that, while the legislative
history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act might be seen as providing
a basis for seeking certainty in patent law, there are other, potentially better
justifications. These other justifications reflect the idea that certainty was
not necessarily attained when the Federal Circuit was created. Instead, the
goal of certainty may still be sought through the jurisprudence of the courts
and, in particular, in the substantive doctrines of patent law, including
through the adoption of rule-based adjudication. Indeed, three other bases
exist, besides the Federal Courts Improvement Act, for invoking the policy
of certainty when deciding what tests to apply in patent-related cases. I
382

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
The Court indicated that “the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent” also
impacted how to resolve the question of whether to allocate the task of claim construction to the court
or jury. Id. at 390. It decided that a bright line rule would be appropriate to foster uniformity: the
judge, not the jury, should construe patent claims. The Court explained that “[i]t was just for the sake
of such desirable uniformity that Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an
exclusive appellate court for patent cases.” Id.
383
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turn to these bases next.
b. General Principles of Law
Judges and commentators sometimes rely upon general principles of
law to justify rule-based adjudication in patent cases. As shown, the
Supreme Court in Markman relied in part upon the doctrine of stare decisis
and a general desire to increase certainty to justify creation of a bright-line
rule that claim construction is the exclusive task of the court. Other
Supreme Court opinions in patent cases expressly focus on a generalized
concept of certainty underlying the law to encourage the adoption of rulelike tests.384 But general principles underlying the law by their very nature
do not provide any reason to favor rule-based adjudication in patent law
any more than in other areas of law.
In this regard, consider Judge O’Malley’s view that the Federal Circuit
should seek to advance certainty when appropriate—but without adopting
patent law exceptionalism as the basis for doing so. She recently remarked
that “the Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that neither the
character of patent law nor the unusual character of our jurisdiction permits
us . . . to create special rules for patent cases.”385 She did not stop there,
however. In her words, “All of this does not mean that there are no
vehicles by which we as a court can make affirmative efforts to improve
uniformity and predictability in patent law.”386 Indeed, she indicated that
“[t]he uniformity Congress hoped we would bring to the patent system is
uniformity born of our own adjudicative function.”387 She suggested
taking specific steps to improve such uniformity and predictability,
including specific suggestions of potential changes in particular doctrinal
areas.388 Given her view that the Supreme Court has rejected patent law
exceptionalism generally389—a broad proposition that, as I discuss below,
may not be accurate—the basis for her conclusion that predictability may
still be advanced through the law articulated by the Federal Circuit may
come from general principles of law.

384
See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1998) (concluding that the Federal
Circuit’s standard-like test for the on-sale bar was improper because it “seriously undermine[d] the
interest in certainty”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)
(“We leave it to the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements [to the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel] to promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to
this area of the law.”).
385
O’Malley, supra note 376, at 98.
386
Id. at 99.
387
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
388
Id. at 99.
389
Id.
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c. The Constitution
Another potential justification for advancing certainty through patent
law doctrine is the Constitution. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc.390—a case addressing patent law that did not pass through the
Federal Circuit—the Supreme Court identified three sources for the
importance of uniformity in patent law.391 One of those three sources was
the Constitution, because the “promot[ion of] national uniformity in the
realm of intellectual property” is “[o]ne of the fundamental purposes
behind the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution.”392 That is,
because the Constitution gives Congress the power to enact law to promote
the progress of technology, state law seeking to serve the same ends may
be preempted. The result of preemption is nationally uniform law in this
area. And the result of a nationally uniform patent law is more certainty as
compared to a scheme involving conflicting state-law patent regimes and
potential difficulties identifying which regimes apply to particular conduct.
Another view of the Patent Clause of the Constitution may provide
further reason to favor rule-based adjudication in patent law. The Patent
Clause is based on a utilitarian, rather than a natural rights, theory of
property, in that it seeks to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”393
To the extent that the promotion of progress of technology is better served
by rules than standards, the Patent Clause may provide reason to favor
rules. For example, if potential inventors would be more likely to invest
time and effort in the inventive process if patent law were more certain,
rules may be more appropriate. Whether any particular rule serves the
utilitarian purposes of patent law better than a standard, however, depends
on the circumstances of the particular patent law issue. And this may be
hotly contested. As an example, consider Festo, where the Federal Circuit
judges disputed the need for a bright line rule to govern the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents based on competing concerns related to incentives
to invest in both the original development of patentable technology and
efforts to design around patented technology.394 I will return to Festo
below.395

390

489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Id. at 162.
392
Id. The other two sources included Congress’s decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts and Congress’s decision to confer exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals in the
Federal Circuit. Id.
393
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
394
See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc).
395
For an extended analysis of the policy-based arguments in favor and against the bright-line
rule adopted by the Federal Circuit in Festo, see generally Taylor, supra note 29.
391
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d. Patent Law Exceptionalism
The nature of legal rights in ideas—that is to say the nature of patent
law itself—may provide another reason to seek certainty in patent law. In
this regard, consider again Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.
There, the Supreme Court explained that the nature of property rights in
ideas provides another reason for favoring uniformity396—and by
extension, certainty—in patent law. Consider the Court’s explanation of
why this is so:
Given the inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas,
and the great power such property has to cause harm to the
competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws,
the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is
“the type of regulation that demands a uniform national
rule.”397
The Court emphasized the need for a uniform national rule establishing
a clear dividing line between public and private rights in ideas (1) because
ideas are inherently ephemeral (consider that it might be better to apply a
uniform, clear, predictable rule to a vague subject matter than to
complicate things exponentially by applying a vague standard to vague
subject matter), and (2) because property rights in ideas may harm
competition in the marketplace of ideas. Importantly, in both respects,
patent law itself may justify more rule-like tests than even traditional
property law.
But the ability to identify the law affecting competition in the
marketplace of ideas is also important, as is having clear and predictable
rules, because of the desire to encourage investment by rational market
participants in developing and disclosing new and useful inventions.398
Indeed, the encouragement of investment in research and development by
prospective patent applicants is one of the very goals of patent law, and
bright-line rules may encourage this investment by eliminating or at least
reducing risk associated with this behavior. But uniformity, clarity, and
predictability in patent law may encourage productive activity not only by
prospective patent applicants, but also by (1) patent owners and their
licensees, because bright-line rules may encourage them to invest in
commercialization of inventions that have already been conceived, and (2)
396

Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162–63.
Id. (quoting Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)).
398
See Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of
Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 83 (1998) (“Reliability of property rules allows market participants to
be more rational in the choices they make to maximize their personal utility in the
marketplace . . . . [which is] consistent with the goal of maximizing social welfare through emphasis on
the individual liberty principle.”).
397

474

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:415

competitors of patent owners and their licenses, because bright-line rules
may encourage them to engage in design-around activities that may result
in the development of additional inventions and commercialization of
technology. Thus, this basis for invoking certainty as a policy to favor
rule-based adjudication in patent law has a similar origin as the
constitutional basis—a utilitarian view of patent law—although it is based
more on pragmatic policy than any positivist interpretation of any legal
text.
Notably, this justification for rule-based adjudication in patent law—
essentially, that patent law inherently favors rule-based adjudication more
so than other areas of the law—reflects the views of several Federal Circuit
judges. Chief Judge Markey, for example, viewed the need to create
uniformity and certainty in patent law as “unique,” “particular,” and
“special” to the Federal Circuit.399 In this sense, he seemingly emphasized
his belief in patent law exceptionalism with respect to rule-based
adjudication.
Judge Newman has expressed a general concern with the use of policydriven analyses to decide cases.400 Nevertheless, as noted above, she
repeatedly focuses on the policy of certainty in her opinions. It is
noteworthy that her justification for using certainty to inform patent law
adjudication derives not only from the formation of the Federal Circuit,
however, but also from the nature of patent law itself. In the latter regard,
she has recognized that “[a] principal goal [of those who formed the
Federal Circuit], the elimination of intercircuit differences, was achieved
overnight, for after October 1, 1982 there was no other forum.”401 And she
has highlighted that unification of the law was achieved by (1) the
selection of the law of the Federal Circuit’s predecessor courts as binding
precedent and (2) the unification in one appellate court of appellate review
of patentability decisions made by the Patent Office and judgment of
district courts deciding patent infringement cases.402 But she has explained
399
See Markey, Challenge and Opportunity, supra note 380, at 595 (“All courts face similar
challenges and opportunities, but the unique mission of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
makes the challenge particular and the opportunity special.”).
400
See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 683, 688 (1993) (“I caution against . . . policy-driven activism whereby the application of the
law will not be known until the Federal Circuit hears the case. . . . It is policy choices that lead to
departure from precedent, into the judicial activism that weighs against legal stability. . . . [P]olicy
choices are not the province of judges.”).
401
Newman, supra note 378, at 524. The creation of the Federal Circuit solved the forumselection problem plaguing patent litigation at the time—the selection of district courts based on the
governing appellate court and its interpretation of patent law. But modern patent litigation includes a
different form of forum-selection—the selection of district courts based on the judges, local procedures
and local rules, and juries. See David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 675–76
(2013) (describing recent attention to forum shopping among various federal district courts).
402
Newman, supra note 378, at 522–24.
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why, nevertheless, certainty is an exceptional policy as applied to patent
law: “Although not all new technologies require the support of a patent in
order to be economically viable, for those that do the degree of legal
certainty, as to patentability and enforceability, is a significant factor in
innovation decisions.”403 Thus, she also favors patent law exceptionalism
with respect to rule-based adjudication, particularly with respect to the
issues of patentability and enforceability. Judge Newman’s willingness to
endorse bright-line rules based on the goal of increased certainty, however,
is limited. In Festo, for example, Judge Newman rejected the majority’s
reliance on certainty as a basis for adoption of the complete bar to the
doctrine of equivalents, a bright-line rule.404 In her view, “the optimum
balance between innovator and imitator in a technology-dependent
economy involves many considerations.”405 In particular, concerns with
certainty and clear notice must be balanced with “innovation and
competition policy.”406 In this regard, Judge Newman’s views seem to
coincide with Professor Dreyfuss’s views.
Judge Linn similarly has recognized that “the goal of uniformity was
achieved procedurally not by years of decisions but by a single act of
Congress in granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
patent cases.”407 Yet he still sees value in rule-based adjudication in patent
law. Indeed, Judge Linn has taken the arguments in favor of rule-based
adjudication to a new level. He concedes that “the Supreme Court . . . is
giving us guidance that promoting uniformity in patent decisions does not
mean creating patent-specific, bright-line rules outside the mainstream of
federal law.”408 But significantly, he is willing to push back against this
guidance. He argues that “[t]he Federal Circuit deals with decisions
affecting business leaders who are looking for clear answers and
unambiguous guidance,” and that ”[b]usiness people like bright-line rules”
because “[i]t is easier to make business decisions when the implications
and consequences of those decisions are well known.”409 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s reticence to endorse bright-line rules “gives [Judge Linn]
some reason to be concerned about future Supreme Court decisions that
403

Newman, supra note 378, at 515.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
405
Id. at 636.
406
Id. at 638–41.
407
Linn, supra note 378, at 735.
408
Richard Linn, Changing Times: Changing Demands, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 6
(2011); see also id. (“[A] consistent theme of the Court’s opinions is the continual endorsement of past
Supreme Court patent opinions and condemnation of patent-specific, bright-line rules in favor of
flexible mainstream dogma.”).
409
Id. at 7; see also id. (“We see this in the disputes that come before us day-in and day-out and in
the regular exchanges we have with the patent bar, including with members in both private practice and
in-house.”).
404
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may overlook the importance of, and the need for, more specific
guidance.”410 Like Judge Newman, however, Judge Linn’s willingness to
endorse bright-line rules is limited. In the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Festo, he also rejected the bright-line rule advanced by the majority—the
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents—based on his view that the
majority was unable to justify such a “dramatic policy shift.”411 In this
way, Judge Linn has also expressed a preference for patent law
exceptionalism favoring bright-line rules, but only when the relevant
policies support their application.
Former Chief Judge Michel likewise has stressed predictability as
particularly important in patent law.412 Furthermore, like Judge Linn, he
has expressly tied predictability to rule-based adjudication. In his words,
“If the parties to [patent] disputes . . . are able to ascertain their rights and
obligations prior to litigation by applying rules set forth in precedent, they
can alter their behavior accordingly.”413 He has discounted the importance
of fairness compared to predictability in patent law.414 And, more
generally, he has stressed that uncertainty creates more lawsuits, “an
undesirable and ultimately an unsustainable result.”415 Like Judges
Newman and Linn, however, Judge Michel rejected the rigid rule of the
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents in Festo because he believed it
“contradict[ed] Supreme Court precedent and policy.”416 Nevertheless, it
is somewhat remarkable that three of the four judges dissenting from the
adoption of the rigid rule of the complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents
in Festo have elsewhere expressed strong support for rule-based
adjudication in patent law.
Judge Plager, who was among the majority in Festo,417 similarly has
expressed his concern that there is an “endemic problem of uncertainty in
law and the judicial decisional process, and particularly in patent law.”418
Indeed, he admits that he has “had long-standing concerns with the
410
Id.; see also id. (“The Supreme Court, on the other hand, deals with legal principles and the
policy implications they engender. The Supreme Court is more accustomed to making general rules
that can be applied on a case-by-case basis to the facts and circumstances as they arise. For the
Supreme Court, bright-line rules are seldom endorsed. This difference in perspective may account for
some of the recent differences in the decisions of the respective courts . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
411
Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
412
See Michel, supra note 373, at 1233–34 (identifying patent litigation, in particular, as the area
of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in which predictability is most important).
413
Id. at 1234.
414
See id. (“Some observers, however, might argue that the costs of less predictability are
justified by the benefits of greater fairness.”).
415
Id. at 1235.
416
Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 598 (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
417
Id. at 562.
418
S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 749, 749 (2010).
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problem of indeterminacy in legal doctrine, especially in patent law.”419
Then, after summarizing Professor Mullally’s article discussing a general
framework for addressing uncertainty in patent law specifically,420 he
proceeds to explain how uncertainty in one particular doctrinal area of
patent law, claim construction, could be addressed.421
These Federal Circuit judges have indicated that certainty provides
unique incentives to favor rules in patent law—but they have repeatedly
said so in law review articles and speeches rather than in judicial opinions.
In terms of judicial decisions, only a handful address the issue. One of the
most detailed Federal Circuit opinions addressing whether patent law
should favor rule-based adjudication is the court’s decision in Festo itself.
There, the en banc Federal Circuit justified its decision to adopt a complete
bar to the doctrine of equivalents, rather than a flexible bar, by explaining
that the promotion of certainty in patent law “cannot help but be frustrated
by the uncertainty inherent in the flexible bar approach.”422 According to
the court, the complete bar, in contrast to the flexible bar, would create
certainty.423 “This certainty will stimulate investment in improvements and
design-arounds because the risk of infringement will be easier to
determine.”424 Moreover, “the difficulty in counseling the public and the
patentee on the scope of protection provided by an amended element is
greatly reduced under the complete bar approach due to the certainty and
predictability such a bar produces.”425 While the Supreme Court vacated
the Federal Circuit’s judgment primarily because it conflicted with
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit’s opinion nevertheless
makes strong arguments in favor of rule-based adjudication in this area of
patent law. Moreover, as Professor Thomas has recognized, even after the
Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the judgment, the law governing the
doctrine of equivalents has become more rule-like.426
As the Supreme Court stressed in reversing the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Festo, however, patent law’s need for certainty does not justify
the use of a rigid rule in every instance.427 The need may be met by
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Id. at 754.
See id. at 754–56 (citing and generally discussing Mullally, supra note 372).
421
See id. Part II.B (discussing various works that address issues of claim construction).
422
Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 575.
423
Id. at 577.
424
Id.
425
Id. at 577–78.
426
See Thomas, supra note 16, at 786 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision largely vindicates
increasingly restrictive Federal Circuit practices regarding the doctrine of equivalents. The Supreme
Court left only three slender opportunities for overcoming prosecution history estoppel . . . .”).
427
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 735, 739 (2002)
(“The Court of Appeals ignored the guidance of Warner-Jenkinson . . . [in which the petitioner]
requested another bright-line rule that would have provided more certainty in determining when
420
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particular patent law doctrines, such as the definiteness requirement, such
that other doctrines need not utilize rule-like tests. Or the need for
certainty may be sufficiently taken into account by particular conceptions
of patent law doctrines, like prosecution history estoppel, without resort to
rule-like tests governing those doctrines.428 Thus, the desire for certainty
in patent law does not necessarily justify rule-based adjudication in every
instance.
In addition to the Federal Circuit judges, Professor Golden has focused
on the uniqueness of patent law as possible support for rule-based
adjudication. He has explained that the Federal Circuit’s “formal
rules . . . whatever their faults, appear intended to promote goals of
certainty, predictability, and fidelity to recent directions from the Supreme
Court.”429 As to the source of these goals, he cites the history of the
legislation that created the Federal Circuit.430 But he also cites the view
that certainty and predictability in patent law are “particularly important to
private planning and commerce.”431 Indeed, “a certainty-promoting
jurisprudence might be understood as . . . supporting ‘a relatively robust’
patent system in which commercial actors will invest.”432
Professor Dreyfuss has recognized both that predictability is a “value
that the [patent] industry holds in high esteem”433 and that the Federal
Circuit’s success in increasing predictability “has very much pleased the
patent industries.”434 Indeed, one particular practitioner who played a role
in the formation of the Federal Circuit, Donald Dunner, has explained that,
in his view, the Federal Circuit “has used bright-line rules to create
uniformity, and where not necessary, it’s used flexible rules.”435 But while
he thinks the Federal Circuit “has done remarkably well in achieving
uniformity”436 by resolving conflicts in patent law that existed among the
regional circuits, he laments that his ability to “predict the outcome of a
Federal Circuit case has been diminished very significantly.”437
estoppel applies but at the cost of disrupting the expectations of countless existing patent holders. We
rejected that approach . . . .”).
428
See id. at 727, 739 (acknowledging that competitors may rely on prosecution history estoppel
to reduce uncertainty while rejecting use of a bright line rule).
429
Golden, supra note 11, at 681.
430
Id. at 719 n.364 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981)).
431
Id. at 687.
432
Id. at 685 (citing Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 314 (2007)).
433
Dreyfuss, supra note 191, at 792.
434
Id. at 798.
435
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit 20th Anniversary Judicial Conference, 217 F.R.D.
548, 562 (2002).
436
Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
437
Id. at 561 (emphasis added). Mr. Dunner’s views highlight that, while uniformity increases
certainty, it does not necessarily result in perfect certainty. The uniform law developed by the Federal
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Professor Dreyfuss has emphasized that the predictability of patent law
is “especially prized” because those subject to patent law’s constraints
“base their decisions to invest in innovation upon their expectations of
achieving patent protection.”438 Her point, of course, focuses on potential
patent applicants. She highlights that potential innovators are potential
patent applicants, and she suggests that they decide whether to engage in
the potentially risky behavior of attempted innovation based less on the
accuracy of patentability determinations by the Patent Office and courts
than on the predictability of those determinations.439 Professor Dreyfuss
does not cite any empirical support for this proposition, but instead relies
upon intuition. Quoting Judge Henry Friendly, she suggests that
businesspeople plan their activities with an eye toward the law governing
patentability, in contrast with criminals who “do not plan their activity with
an eye fixed on the Bill of Rights, the Federal Penal Code, or the rules of
evidence applicable in criminal trials.”440 To assist businesspeople,
Professor Dreyfuss suggests that legal rules may be helpful. And she
suggests that a specialized court may be better than a generalized court to
craft these legal rules. She summarizes these points succinctly by stating
that “actors who make decisions in reliance on legal rules benefit more
from specialization than do . . . actors who look primarily to the law’s
compensatory aspects.”441
Professor Dreyfuss’s point may be expanded to cover the broader
group of potential innovators I have already mentioned, in particular those
contemplating the ability to avoid infringing others’ patents. In this
context as well, intuition seems to indicate that potential innovators would
prefer predictability over accuracy. Of course there are various other legal
doctrines about which potential innovators surely also care. For example,
potential innovators no doubt care about remedies, including both damages
calculations and injunctive relief.
There are, of course, competing views and concerns. Chief Judge
Young from the District of Massachusetts, for example, has harshly
criticized the Federal Circuit for its “careful delineation of ever more
Circuit and the Supreme Court may or may not be predictable; that is one of many challenges
confronting the courts.
438
Dreyfuss, supra note 183, at 419.
439
Id. In this regard, note that the potential patent applicant is perfectly happy with an inaccurate
determination that its innovation is patentable even if the “right” determination is that its innovation is
not patentable. The potential patent applicant is never happy if its prediction regarding patentability is
incorrect. In that situation, the potential patent applicant has either wasted its effort in attempting to
secure a patent (and potentially invested money in research and development that will not provide any
return on its investment given the lack of a patent), or not engaged in the research and development in
the first place when a patent could have been obtained on the invention.
440
Id. at 420 n.182 (quoting Henry Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 634, 639 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
441
Id. at 420.
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explicit and detailed rules, a ‘patent code,’ if you will.”
He blames the
fact that, “[u]nlike the other circuit courts of appeal, the Federal Circuit
came into being, in part, pursuant to an express Congressional mandate to
foster uniformity in the application of the law of patents.”443 Highlighting
the Federal Circuit’s insistence on creating a bright-line rule in Festo,
Judge Young contrasts the Federal Circuit’s perceived mandate with the
mandate of every district court—litigation on a case-by-case basis with a
special role for juries to decide disputes.444 In Judge Young’s words, it is a
“[s]mall wonder, then, that intellectual tension exists as the [Federal
Circuit] struggles to impose its vision and to shape the views of those
courts that rightly consider themselves the prime guardians of the most
vital expression of direct democracy in America today—the jury of the
people.”445
Thus, Judge Young rejects the Federal Circuit’s preference for brightline rules in view of two general principles: (1) that the law should provide
flexibility to judges to handle matters on a case-by-case basis; and (2) that
legal issues should be submitted to juries rather than decided by judges
based on bright-line rules.446 What all of this highlights is that, to the
extent that any argument is made in favor of rule-based adjudication based
on notions of uniformity and certainty derived from patent exceptionalism,
that argument must overcome these general principles of law and others
like them. Indeed, it seems appropriate to place the burden of persuasion
on the proponent of rule-based adjudication.
2. The Impact of Policies Supporting Rule-Based Adjudication on
Particular Patent Law Doctrines
At the heart of the fourth basis for invoking certainty to justify rulebased adjudication in patent law is the question whether patent law really is
exceptional, that is whether it is so unique that it should be treated
differently than other areas of the law.447 One argument in favor of patent
law exceptionalism hinges on property law exceptionalism. A patent right
is a property right, so the argument goes, and property rights are
exceptional compared to other areas of the law in the sense that bright-line

442

Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 2001).
Id. at 123.
444
Id. at 124–25.
445
Id.
446
Id. at 124.
447
For an analysis of patent law exceptionalism as compared to antitrust law, see C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1597–604 (2006). For a retort to arguments that patent law is by its very nature
exceptional, see Liivak, supra note 288, at 1169–73.
443
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rules are necessary to spur investment in property.
Indeed, as Professor
Kennedy has noted, “[T]he first self-conscious general statement of
principles for the choice of form, at least by an American, is [Professor
Roscoe] Pound’s Theory of Judicial Decision, published in 1923.”449
Professor Pound’s thesis was that “rules of law . . . which are applied
mechanically are more adapted to property and to business transactions;
standards where application proceeds upon intuition are more adapted to
human conduct and to the conduct of enterprises.”450
If Pound was correct, then the relevant question is whether patent
law—or, more precisely, issues raised in patent law—are more like
“property and . . . business transactions” or “human conduct and . . . the
conduct of enterprises.”451 These categories are rather vague and, anyway,
it could be argued that patent law fits within both categories in different
circumstances. But the underlying reason for distinguishing between these
categories is that decision making regarding property and business
transactions is made ex ante in the view of the law, and therefore the law
should be identifiable, clear, and predictable to encourage optimal
investments in property and other business transactions. Other forms of
human conduct may not involve making ex ante decisions based on
assessments of risk and cost. Examples include potentially criminal or
tortious behavior by individuals and enterprises.452
Applied to patent law, the question is whether, ex ante, patent
applicants, patent owners, and potential infringers consider risks and costs
associated with their technology-based activities, and whether they would
invest more heavily in these activities if the risk and cost could be reduced
by the adoption of more formal, rule-like tests governing the relevant
aspects of patent law. It seems apparent that rational patent applicants,
patent owners, and potential infringers would consider these risks and costs
448
See Liivak, supra note 288, at 1167–68 (“Building a patent narrative around traditional
property is a revolutionary step forward.”); see also id. at 1182 (“[T]he genius of a property rights
system is that it relies on . . . judicial discretion as little as possible.” (quoting JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 222 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This
argument must overcome significant differences between patent rights and real property rights,
including the ephemeral and non-rivalrous nature of ideas. See id. (“[T]raditional property deals with
scarce, rival resources . . . . Nonrival ideas that are at the heart of patent law just do not seem to fit.”).
449
Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1702.
450
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, III, 36
HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
451
Pound, supra note 450, at 951.
452
That is not to say that there are not other reasons to favor bright-line rules to govern even these
areas of law. In criminal law, for example, the fact that legal tests will be applied by law enforcement
personnel provides an independent basis to favor bright-line rules in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1045 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that a “clear
rule simplifies the task of officers who encounter occupants during a search”). Identifying the legal
decision-maker and determining whether to constrain their discretion are important factors in
considering rule-based adjudication, a topic that I address next.
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in advance if they had access to this information, and that they would
invest more heavily in their activities if that risk and cost could be reduced.
Whether these parties act rationally and whether this information is freely
available is another, perhaps intractable question.
Another approach centers around answering the question of whether a
rule would be helpful to narrow options available to the relevant legal
decision-makers.
As Professor Frederick Schauer has explained,
“Formalism . . . achieves its value when it is thought desirable to narrow
the decisional opportunities and the decisional range of a certain class of
decisionmakers.”453 In the context of patent law, relevant potential
decision-makers include patent examiners, juries, and judges. To the
extent that their decisions can be made more predictable, then patent
applicants, patent owners, and potential infringers may discount the cost
associated with risk and invest more heavily in productive activities.454
Identifying the decision-makers related to specific patent law doctrines,
then, may go a long way towards identifying whether certainty (in both its
forms of clarity and predictability) deserves substantial weight in the
formation of governing legal tests. The ultimate question using this
approach, then, is whether particular decision-makers should be given
discretion or have their discretion constrained.
Within patent law, decision making sometimes is exclusive to one
decision-maker, but more often is nonexclusive. Patent examiners
consider only issues concerning patent eligibility and validity; they do not
consider issues of infringement, damages, or injunctions. Juries consider
questions of fact, some of which overlap with the purview of patent
examiners, like invalidity by anticipation, and some of which do not, like
infringement and damages. Juries may also give advisory verdicts on
questions of law that are based on subsidiary questions of fact, like
obviousness, but they do not consider other questions of law, such as claim
construction and injunctive relief. Judges at one point or another may
consider every issue raised in a patent case, particularly in view of the
ability to consider motions for summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law, but they have final decision-making power only on issues
that ultimately are questions of law, like claim construction, obviousness,
and injunctive relief.
Juries, the proverbial black box, of course are notorious for
unpredictability. The average juror likely has little experience with
technology generally, let alone the technology raised in a particular patent
case. Presumably he or she lacks any knowledge of the governing law, and
patent law is extraordinarily complex as shown by the long and detailed
453

Schauer, supra note 49, at 544.
See, e.g., Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1737, 1740–41 (2011) (describing costs to potential infringers of ambiguous patent claims).
454
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model jury instructions provided for use in patent cases.
As a result, at
least based on this mode of analysis, patent law issues decided by juries are
prime targets for rule-based tests.
Likewise, very few judges have technical degrees or backgrounds, let
alone technical knowledge matching the field of particular patent cases.
This lack of technical knowledge is compounded to the extent a judge has
little experience with patent cases and therefore less knowledge of the
governing law. Moreover, if Justice Scalia is correct, “[f]ederal judges . . .
are not interested in . . . getting into the weeds of patent law.”456 And there
is reason to think that he is correct.457 The judges of the Federal Circuit
and the district court judges electing to participate in the Patent Pilot
Program may be some of the only exceptions. Regardless, when these
concerns exist, courts have a better basis to consider the appropriateness of
rule-based tests for patent law issues decided by judges.
It is not surprising that rule-based adjudication may seem appropriate
for decision making by juries and some judges in patent cases, at least to
the extent these cases involve highly complex, technical subject matter.
Professor Lee has explained that one of the purposes and effects of rulebased adjudication in patent law is to reduce the need to engage in the
difficult task of sorting through complex technical information.458 To the
extent that he is correct, his analysis applies specifically to juries and
courts but less so to patent examiners given their technical expertise.459
Taken to its extreme, however, this justification for the use of rule-based
adjudication—a need to constrain the decision-making power of juries and
judges—creates the problem highlighted by Professor Rai where the
Federal Circuit decides factual matters in patent cases using the de novo

455
See, e.g., THE NAT’L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(2009), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJuryInstructions
.pdf (consisting of sixty-five pages of jury instructions).
456
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118).
457
See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 388 & n.3 (describing “traditional judicial disenchantment with patent cases” and citing statements
by past Supreme Court Justices).
458
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 16, at 4–7.
459
Given Professor Lee’s analysis, it is somewhat ironic that the Federal Circuit favors reducing
engagement with complex technical information, but the Supreme Court does not. See id. at 41
(explaining that the Federal Circuit adheres to “formalistic jurisprudence,” which allows for less
familiarity with technical knowledge); id. at 42 (suggesting that the Supreme Court has adopted a
“holistic” approach, which “will increase technological engagement”). The Federal Circuit—which,
based on its exclusive jurisdiction, has the most experience dealing with cases involving complex
technical information and therefore might be most comfortable with complex technical information—
appears to discount the ability of district court judges to sort through complex technical information.
But the Supreme Court—which has the least experience dealing with these cases and therefore
presumably is least comfortable with complex technical information—does not.
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standard of review.
That is, the decision-making power of juries and
judges is constrained the most when an issue is determined to be a matter
of law subject to de novo review by the Federal Circuit.
To the extent that an issue requires a decision by a patent examiner,
this mode of analysis may still allow for a rule-like test. The reason,
however, is not an inability to understand complex technical subject
matter, but the possibility of inconsistent applications of patent law.
Inconsistency may result from the sheer number of patent examiners,461 the
probability that patent examiners have varying knowledge of the governing
law,462 and the lack of incentives on patent examiners to use any discretion
provided by the law evenhandedly in an ex parte proceeding. Thus, given
the various concerns with respect to all three types of potential decisionmakers in the field of patent law, there is good reason at least to consider
the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication for particular patent law
issues.
When legal issues in patent cases are determined multiple times by
multiple decision-makers, moreover, rule-based adjudication may be
particularly appropriate. Consider patentability issues. Any decision
regarding patentability by a patent examiner is subject to reconsideration
by juries, judges, or both, either in a direct appeal or in a collateral
challenge in a patent infringement lawsuit. An example is the novelty
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.463 The fulfillment of this requirement is
potentially presented to patent examiners, juries, and judges. In this
regard, note that, as discussed above, the Supreme Court moved patent law
toward a rule-based test in Pfaff based on a concern with the uncertainty of
the Federal Circuit’s totality-of-the circumstances test.464
Now consider claim construction. The meaning of claim language is a
central concern in patent litigation because it affects the vast majority of
other legal issues that arise in patent cases. Indeed, the meaning of the
claim language affects all issues of patentability (eligibility, novelty,
barring activities, non-obviousness, and disclosure requirements) and
infringement. Thus, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court in Markman
confirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision that judges, rather than juries,
should determine the meaning of claim language given concerns with

460
See Rai, supra note 16, at 1042–65 (describing the Federal Circuit as “arrogat[ing] power over
factual questions”).
461
The Patent Office employs several thousand patent examiners. Patent Examiner Positions,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Aug.
25, 2013).
462
Patent examiners need not be law school graduates. See id. (listing qualification
requirements).
463
35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 2011).
464
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65–66 & n.11 (1998); see supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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uniformity and certainty.
Not only is the identity of the decision-maker a key component
regarding the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent cases,
but the nature of the legal question is also critically important. To the
extent the legal question depends on potentially subjective views of
circumstances, the legal question may be better suited for a rule-based test.
Primary examples include the non-obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) and the doctrine of equivalents.466 In this regard, note the tension
between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court with respect to the
extent to which the governing law should reflect the policy of certainty. In
KSR the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of
the TSM test as a component of the non-obviousness analysis.467 The
Federal Circuit’s test provided more certainty. The Supreme Court,
however, tempered the doctrine, injecting it with more flexibility, yet
nevertheless still accepting the usefulness of identifying a reason to
combine the prior art before reaching a conclusion of obviousness.468
Likewise, in Festo the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions
display contrary views of the importance of certainty in formulating a test
for constraining application of the doctrine of equivalents using
prosecution history estoppel.469
In short, given the nature of patent law and the importance of certainty
to patent applicants, patentees, and potential infringers, there is reason to
consider whether rule-based adjudication may be appropriate in particular
circumstances with respect to particular patent law doctrines. The
resolution of whether rule-based adjudication is appropriate with respect to
specific patent-law doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article. But this
Article has presented a framework for considering the degree to which
rule-based adjudication might be appropriate in any circumstance. The
appropriate adjudicatory approach depends on the extent to which the
doctrine in question should reflect the goal of certainty, and to what extent
it should reflect other goals including flexibility, fairness, and justice. In
making these determinations, the identity of the decision-makers and the
nature of the legal question are important variables in the analysis. Indeed,
465
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). The Federal Circuit is
currently considering the question of whether it should review district court claim constructions with
deference. See generally Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 Fed.
App’x. 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (granting rehearing en banc).
466
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (non-obviousness); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (doctrine of equivalents).
467
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
468
Id. at 418.
469
Compare Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 569 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (suggesting that prosecution history estoppel is a complete bar to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents), with Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737–38 (2002) (adopting a flexible bar approach
when analyzing prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents).
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it is important to consider the underlying goals sought to be achieved by
the legal question, the level of confidence in the ability of a rule or a
standard to achieve the identified underlying goals, and the level of
confidence in the ability of the decision-makers who might be called upon
to enforce the rule or standard.
B. The Roles of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit with Respect to
Rule-Based Adjudication
Given the reasons for the Federal Circuit to increase certainty in patent
law, the next normative inquiry asks how the Federal Circuit should do so,
and how the Supreme Court should review the Federal Circuit’s decisions
seeking to increase certainty.
1. The Federal Circuit’s Role
It is the Federal Circuit’s role, in the first instance, to consider the
appropriateness of rule-based adjudication, to adopt it when appropriate
based on the court’s analysis of the need for certainty, and to provide a
well-reasoned and well-documented explanation of that analysis for review
by the litigants, the patent bar, and the Supreme Court. It is the Supreme
Court’s role, in turn, to question the appropriateness of rule-based
adjudication when it is adopted by the Federal Circuit, to reject it when it is
not appropriate based on its own analysis of the need for certainty, and to
provide helpful explanations of its decisions to reject rule-based
adjudication in favor of standard-based adjudication. In this way, the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court may engage in a dialogue
concerning the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent law
and, ultimately, reach a balanced approach to the law that takes into
account the goal of certainty—which as discussed above exists generally in
the law but may have more importance in patent law—as well as the
countervailing interests in flexibility and accuracy.
a. Practicing Humility Through Detailed Self-Examination
There are certain things the Federal Circuit can and should do to
ensure that patent law is not burdened by excessive rule-based
adjudication. First, the Federal Circuit should practice humility through
detailed self-examination of its law favoring rule-like tests. In this regard,
the Federal Circuit’s opinions to date often include little discussion of the
underlying policies driving the court’s decisions. Indeed, judges at the
Federal Circuit have indicated that, as a general rule, they purposefully
avoid including policy discussion in their opinions.470 To the extent a
470
See Newman, supra note 400, at 688 (describing reasons for refraining from addressing policy
in judicial opinions); Plager & Pettigrew, supra note 26, at 1750–52 (same); see also O’Malley, supra
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general rule of avoiding policy discussion is appropriate, discussion of
certainty should be an exception. That is, Federal Circuit judges should
expressly note instances in which they believe the interest of certainty
justifies rule-like tests in patent law. In other words, they should explain
why the use of rules over standards is justified by the interest in achieving
certainty. To omit this policy-based reasoning is to invite the Supreme
Court to discount the importance of certainty—and given its lack of
experience in patent cases, the Court may not appreciate the value of that
certainty in particular circumstances. Once the Federal Circuit includes
this policy-based analysis, it will begin the process of engaging the
Supreme Court in a dialogue regarding the appropriateness of rule-based
adjudication in patent law.
Until relatively recently the two courts had not engaged in that
dialogue very often. As discussed above, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Festo provides an example of express consideration of certainty as a
potential justification for rule-based adjudication on the issue of the
doctrine of equivalents.471 Another example, albeit an awkward one,
occurred after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR to consider the
requirement of non-obviousness but before the Supreme Court’s oral
argument. During that time period, the Federal Circuit issued several
opinions explaining how the TSM requirement was a flexible rather than
an overly rigid rule and, anyway, appropriate because it advanced the
policy of predictability.472 In the end, the Supreme Court took note of
these opinions,473 and, to some degree, agreed with the Federal Circuit by
holding that, “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court . . . to determine
whether there was an apparent reason to combine . . . known elements in
the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”474
note 376, at 98 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that neither the character of patent
law nor the unusual character of our jurisdiction permits us to don a policy-making mantle or to create
special rules for patent cases.”).
471
See supra Part V.A.1.d (discussing the Festo decision in relation to the doctrine of
equivalents).
472
See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only permits, but requires,
consideration of common knowledge and common sense.”); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d
1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a
motivation may be found implicitly in the prior art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual
teaching to combine . . . . In conclusion, our approach has permitted us to continue to address an issue
of law not readily amenable to bright-line rules, as we recall and are guided by the wisdom of the
Supreme Court in striving for a ‘practical test of patentability.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966))); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Board must provide
some rationale, articulation, or reasoned basis to explain why the conclusion of obviousness is correct.
The requirement of such an explanation is consistent with governing obviousness law, and helps ensure
predictable patentability determinations.” (citation omitted)).
473
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418, 421.
474
Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
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Today, the balance between the Supreme Court’s preference for
standard-based adjudication and the Federal Circuit’s preference for rulebased adjudication is playing out in the context of the Supreme Court’s
continued review of Federal Circuit decisions regarding the law governing
patent eligibility. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently addressed all
three of the judicially-created exceptions to patent eligibility. In Bilski, the
Court addressed the exception for abstract ideas.475 In Mayo, it addressed
the exception for laws of nature.476 And in Myriad, it effectively addressed
the exception for physical phenomena, although the court described the
exception as the one for laws of nature.477 Only in Myriad did the Court
provide any rule-like test, applying a “rule against patents on naturally
occurring things.”478
In Bilski, the Supreme Court failed to identify any guidelines for
analyzing the patent eligibility of alleged abstract ideas.479 Likewise, in
Mayo, the Court provided only vague pronouncements concerning the
appropriate test for determining patent eligibility of applications of natural
laws.480 Those pronouncements not only seemingly contradict prior
Supreme Court precedent directly on point,481 but also seemingly combine
the concepts of patent eligibility, enablement, novelty, and nonobviousness into one unwieldy test;482 invite subjective decision making;
and thus fail to provide any real constraint on the discretion of examiners
and courts considering patent eligibility. In view of these developments,
the Federal Circuit has noted that the lack of direction for fact-finders has

475
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221–22 (2010) (ruling that a method of hedging risk in
commodities trading falls under the abstract idea exception).
476
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (ruling
that a method for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs falls under the law of nature
exception).
477
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117–18 (2013)
(evaluating whether a patent covering a sequence of human genes falls under the law of nature
exception).
478
Id. at 2116.
479
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230–31 (relying on an analysis of prior cases rather than application
of particular factors when deciding what constitutes an abstract idea).
480
See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (referring to conditions that must be
satisfied in order to transform “unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those
laws”).
481
Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981) (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”), with Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (“[T]he Court’s precedents . . . . insist that a process that
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements,
sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts
to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.” (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594 (1978))).
482
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1303–04.
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caused “great uncertainty.”
As a result, it has advocated the extreme
solution of avoiding the law governing patent eligibility to “bring a degree
of certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the
marketplace.”484 The court also recently attempted—but failed, badly—to
speak as one voice on the issue of eligibility of computer-related
inventions to provide the certainty so many of its judges desire.485
While Professor Duffy has argued that any effort to define rules for
patent eligibility is destined for failure,486 again an appropriate question to
ask is what degree of formalism is appropriate in this context. If rules and
standards lie on the extreme ends of a continuum, then one still might
attempt to select the appropriate location on the continuum between rulebased adjudication and standard-based adjudication. Indeed, a debate over
the need for certainty within the Federal Circuit and between the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court on patent eligibility and other doctrines
would be healthy.
Similarly, while some might argue that the increasing number and
proportion of cases in the last decade where the Supreme Court rejected
Federal Circuit tests as overly rule-bound indicates that there is a problem,
483
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 484 Fed.
App’x. 559 (per curiam) (granting rehearing en banc).
484
See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts could
avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their inherent power to control the processes of
litigation, and insist that litigants initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of
patentability defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112. If that were done in
the typical patent case, litigation over the question of validity of the patent would be concluded under
these provisions, and it would be unnecessary to enter the murky morass that is § 101 jurisprudence.
This would make patent litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of
certainty to the interests of both patentees and their competitors in the marketplace.” (citation omitted)).
Not all Federal Circuit judges agree, however. In Judge Mayer’s view, “[t]he issue of whether a
claimed method meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an
‘antecedent question’ that must be addressed before this court can consider whether particular claims
are invalid as obvious or anticipated.” Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing In re Comiskey, 554
F.3d 967, 975 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
485
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per
curiam) (affirming the district court’s holding, by a majority vote but without a controlling opinion, that
“asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101,” and affirming the district court’s holding, by an equally divided court, that “the
asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under the statute”); see also id. at
1321 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The ascendance of section 101 as an independent source of litigation,
separate from the merits of patentability, is a new uncertainty for inventors. The court, now rehearing
this case en banc, hoped to ameliorate this uncertainty by providing objective standards for section 101
patent-eligibility. Instead we have propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of
consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and cost of the system of patents as an incentive
for innovation.”); id. at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections) (“I enjoy good writing and a good
mystery, but I doubt that innovation is promoted when subjective and empty words like ‘contribution’
or ‘inventiveness’ are offered up by the courts to determine investment, resource allocation, and
business decisions.”).
486
See Duffy, supra note 64, at 614 (arguing that rules defining patent eligibility always fail in the
long run because the innovation that spurs changing circumstances renders existing rules obsolete).
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this actually indicates the institutional system is functioning correctly. It is
the role of a generalist court of last resort to view rule-based adjudication
by a more specialized court with suspicion and, in the absence of wellreasoned justification for rule-based adjudication, to overturn the rulebased test created by the more specialized court. And if the court of last
resort lacks sufficient expertise to provide an independent analysis of the
benefits and costs associated with rule-based adjudication as applied to a
particular doctrine, all it can and should do is review the reasoning of the
more specialized court’s evaluation and reject that reasoning when it is not
persuaded.
The burden on the Federal Circuit to explain its basis for favoring rulebased adjudication is particularly high when it reverses its own precedent
in favor of rule-based adjudication. This is because the certainty that is
advanced by the general legal principle of stare decisis weighs against
reversing precedent, and so any certainty gained by advancing a rule-like
test must exceed the uncertainty created by changing the law. This is
exactly the situation that confronted the Federal Circuit in Festo, given that
it was enforcing a radical change in the law governing the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel, and so in its opinion it
provided a detailed explanation of the importance of certainty in the
context of questions of infringement.487 But even when the Federal Circuit
sustains rule-based adjudication based on its own precedent, its
predecessor court’s precedent, or even the Supreme Court’s precedent, the
Federal Circuit should consider providing a detailed and well-reasoned
justification so that the Supreme Court may serve its own role in the
present institutional system by analyzing the strength of that justification.
Indeed, the need to provide detailed and well-reasoned justification for
rule-based adjudication may be most pronounced where rule-based
adjudication would run contrary to general principles of law drawn from
non-patent cases, that is, instances of rule-based patent law exceptionalism.
In other words, the Federal Circuit should provide detailed and wellreasoned justification for patent law to differ from the rest of the law with
respect to the choice between rule-based adjudication and standard-based
adjudication. There may be reasons for doing so, including the difficulty
of legal decision-makers to engage in standard-based adjudication and
associated concerns with costs imposed on patent applicants, patentees,
and potential infringers. But, whatever the reasons, the Federal Circuit
should clearly identify them and provide a well-reasoned, policy-based
explanation—despite judges’ potential uncomfortableness in doing so488—
487
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (discussing the problems with the flexible bar approach), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
488
See, e.g., Plager, supra note 418, at 773–74 (indicating uncomfortableness addressing policy in
judicial opinions).
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to ensure appropriate consideration of the value of certainty and rule-based
adjudication by the Supreme Court.
b. Identifying Rule-Like Tests Worthy of Reconsideration
Second, the Federal Circuit judges should signal when cases enforcing
rule-based adjudication are worthy of en banc or Supreme Court review.
Dissenting opinions written by Federal Circuit judges disagreeing with
panel decisions and especially the en banc court may highlight excessive
use of rules. Likewise, parties and scholars should continue to highlight
overly-formalistic, rule-based holdings of the Federal Circuit. Amicus
briefs by non-parties, including individual companies, organizations of
companies, and organizations of patent attorneys, all should assist both the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court in vetting rule-bound areas of patent
law in need of reconsideration. In short, the Federal Circuit and all other
interested parties should seek to identify rule-like tests worthy of
reconsideration by the Federal Circuit prior to the time the Supreme Court
is asked to review a Federal Circuit decision on point. In this way, the
Federal Circuit may police its own preference for rule-based adjudication.
In addition, the Federal Circuit’s view as to the appropriateness of rulebased adjudication may be guaranteed to be heard—unlike in KSR where
the Federal Circuit judges addressed the question of excessive rule-based
adjudication in one doctrinal area only after the Supreme Court had agreed
to hear a case on point.
2. The Supreme Court’s Role
Commentators and Federal Circuit judges routinely assign
responsibility for the development of patent law to the Federal Circuit.
This view of the role of the Federal Circuit, of course, is improper if it
implies that the Federal Circuit bears ultimate responsibility for patent law.
To the extent Congress and the President have given the judiciary
responsibility for developing patent law,489 it is the Supreme Court that
bears ultimate responsibility for the law emanating from the judiciary,
including the Federal Circuit. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court’s
responsibility to supervise the Federal Circuit and correct its errant ways
by granting review of cases and reversing the Federal Circuit when
appropriate.
Thus, it is the Supreme Court’s role to question the appropriateness of
rule-based adjudication when it is adopted by the Federal Circuit, to reject
it when it is not appropriate, and to provide helpful explanations of its
decisions to reject rule-based adjudication in favor of standard-based
adjudication. As shown, a study of the history of the Supreme Court’s
489
See Rai, supra note 16, at 1041 (suggesting Congress delegated policymaking responsibility in
patent law to the judiciary).
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review of patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit demonstrates that the
Supreme Court may not have engaged in the proper role of a generalized
court reviewing a semi-specialized court until relatively recently.490
The Supreme Court should police the Federal Circuit’s preference for
rule-based adjudication, but it should do so taking into consideration the
normative bases supporting rule-based adjudication, and in particular the
importance of certainty in patent law. The Supreme Court should
recognize that it is the expected practice, indeed the preferred practice, of a
semi-specialized court to consider the appropriateness of rule-based
adjudication, particularly as the court’s collective experience with legal
subject matter, and therefore expertise with that legal subject matter,
increases. It is the Supreme Court’s role, however, not only to police the
Federal Circuit’s use of rule-based adjudication, but also to police its own
preference for standard-based adjudication. In short, the Supreme Court
should tend to permit rule-based adjudication when the Federal Circuit’s
opinions reasonably justify rules in light of the importance of certainty
given the particular legal doctrine and the affected decision-makers, but
also to demand standard-based adjudication when they do not.
a. Identifying Rule-Like Tests Worthy of Reconsideration
There are basic things the Supreme Court can and should do to
increase its effectiveness in policing patent law for excess rule-based
adjudication. First, the Supreme Court should expand its traditional bases
for granting certiorari to the Federal Circuit to include the purpose of
policing the Federal Circuit’s perceived penchant for rule-based
adjudication. Other than the parties’ petitions for certiorari, the Supreme
Court should look to the dissents of judges at the Federal Circuit, as well as
amicus briefs for suggestions that patent law doctrines have become
excessively rule-bound. The role of the Solicitor General of the United
States and the Patent Office cannot be overlooked in this regard.491 The
Supreme Court has made it a practice of requesting the view of the United
States regarding whether it should grant certiorari in patent cases, and the
view of the United States is determined by the Solicitor General in
consultation with various agencies of the federal government, including but

490
See supra Part IV.B (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in relation to
those of the Federal Circuit). As Professor Golden has pointed out, there is reason to think that the
Supreme Court is not even a generalized court because of its focus on constitutional and statutory
interpretation. Golden, supra note 11, at 674–86. If he is correct, that only bolsters the idea that the
Supreme Court should exercise restraint in its review of Federal Circuit decisions to invoke rule-based
adjudication in patent law.
491
See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 518, 550–52 (2010) (discussing the importance of the Solicitor General’s Office in
deciding if patent law doctrines should be altered via Supreme Court review).
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not limited to the Patent Office.
Thus, the individuals in those
government positions should consider whether the Federal Circuit has
enforced excessive rule-based adjudication in particular patent doctrines
and report the consensus view to the Supreme Court.
If rule-based adjudication in patent law is inherently a problem, one
solution is to make institutional changes with an eye toward overcoming
the Federal Circuit’s bias towards rules over standards. For example, as
discussed above, some have suggested that the Federal Circuit’s caseload
should be diversified to emphasize general rather than specialized
jurisdiction, while others have at least raised the possibility of eliminating
the Federal Circuit. As a practical matter, at least in the short term, the
recent influx of new judges without patent law experience or expertise may
reduce the Federal Circuit’s bias towards rules in patent cases if ruleRule-based
making correlates to experience within the field.493
adjudication in patent cases, however, is not inherently a problem given
potential justifications for use of rules in patent cases. And while excess
rule-based adjudication may be a problem, it may be viewed, not as a
symptom of underlying problems regarding the institutional structure in
which the Federal Circuit exists, but as a reflection of the lack of adequate
oversight by the Supreme Court when the Federal Circuit has engaged in
rule-based adjudication. In particular, the Supreme Court should review
petitions for certiorari to the Federal Circuit with an eye toward identifying
unjustified rule-based adjudication—use of rules in the absence of policybased justifications—and grant a sufficient number of petitions to provide
the necessary oversight with respect to the plethora of issues that arise in
patent cases.
b. Practicing Humility Through Restraint
Second, the Supreme Court should be careful to avoid going too far in
enforcing standard-based adjudication that contradicts well-grounded
policy justified by the Federal Circuit based on its experience and expertise
492
See id. at 525–31, 546 (describing increasing calls for the views of the Solicitor General in
patent cases since 1994 and explaining that “the Solicitor General’s Office can also draw on the
expertise found elsewhere in the executive branch; it may draw on the [US]PTO’s experience”); Gary
M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the
Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining if It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 227, 247 (2010) (describing the importance of the views of the Solicitor General).
493
Three of the four most recently confirmed judges did not have any notable experience with
patent law prior to joining the court. See Todd M. Hughes, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/todd-m-hughes-circuit-judge.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2013) (providing biographical details); Jimmie V. Reyna, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2013) (same); Evan J. Wallach, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/evan-j-wallach-circuit-judge.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2013)
(same).
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analyzing issues arising in patent cases.
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court should consider its own
limitations in identifying when rule-based adjudication may be appropriate
as applied to a particular patent law legal issue. In various remarks, Justice
Scalia has highlighted his relative inexperience, lack of expertise, and even
lack of interest in patent law. For example, in a concurring opinion in
Cardinal Chemical, he recognized his own inexperience by noting that a
particular point was “much less tied to general principles of law with
which I am familiar, and much more related to the peculiarities of patent
litigation, with which I deal only sporadically.”494 In recent remarks
reported by the American Bar Association, he conceded his lack of
knowledge about patent law.495 And in a recent oral argument, he confided
his view that “[f]ederal judges, including this [f]ederal judge, are not
interested in . . . getting into the weeds of patent law.”496 There is no
reason to think that, in these respects, Justice Scalia is not a representative
sample of the Supreme Court Justices.
Perhaps in view of its relative inexperience and lack of expertise, the
Supreme Court may have gone too far in rejecting rule-like tests in favor of
standard-like tests governing patent law. In particular, as discussed above,
two of the Court’s three recent opinions on patent eligibility have rejected
defined constraints on the relevant decision-makers—patent examiners and
judges—resulting in the kind of uncertainty and unpredictability that may
be problematic for a property-based legal system, particularly for patent
law. Indeed, as discussed by Professor Golden, the Supreme Court’s
forays into patent law often result in bad law and uncertainty.497 Thus,
there are reasons to believe that the Supreme Court should temper its own
understandable and desirable preference for standard-based adjudication
when reviewing well-reasoned opinions by the Federal Circuit.
***
At the beginning of the last decade of the Supreme Court’s review of
Federal Circuit decisions governing patent law, Professor Duffy captured
the essence of the benefit of adopting the respective roles of the Supreme
494

Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 103 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Gaëtan Gerville-Réache, Justice Scalia at the AJEI Summit in New Orleans, APP. ISSUES, Feb.
2013, at 3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate_issues/201
3win_al.authckeckdam.pdf (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, “I don’t know squat about patents.”).
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118). In
addition to these admissions, Justice Scalia recently decided not to join a majority opinion in a patent
case dealing with particularly complex science given that he was unable to affirm fine details of
molecular biology “on [his] own knowledge or even [his] own belief.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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Golden, supra note 11, at 687–89.
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Court and Federal Circuit I have identified here:
[T]he combination of a generalist Supreme Court and a
specialized appellate court can function—or, at least, can
function effectively—only if the generalist court’s
acceptance of its limited competence is matched by the
specialized court’s acceptance of its limited authority. In
other words, the combination can work if each institution
practices the virtue of humility.498
A decade after these prescient words, it remains unclear whether the
two courts have the self-discipline to practice the virtue of humility in the
context of advancing both certainty and flexibility in patent law. For the
sake of the future of the patent system and its need for the right balance of
certainty and flexibility, let’s hope humility prevails.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have a unique relationship,
that of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court and a generalized
appellate court of last resort. Given this unique relationship, each court has
a unique and robust role. Contrary to most prior scholarship, this Article
advances the position that, given normative justifications for seeking
certainty in patent law, the Federal Circuit serves its role in the current
institutional design when, as a semi-specialized intermediate appellate
court, it considers the appropriateness of rule-based adjudication in patent
cases. In short, the Federal Circuit’s consideration of rule-based
adjudication is not, in and of itself, a problem. Indeed, it is the expected
and preferred approach of a semi-specialized intermediate appellate court.
This Article also advances the position, however, that it is the Supreme
Court’s fundamental responsibility to police the Federal Circuit’s
preference for rule-based adjudication. This policing function, while
complex, should include two changes to the Supreme Court’s current
jurisprudential approach to patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit.
First, the Supreme Court should expand its traditional bases for granting
certiorari to include the purpose of policing the Federal Circuit’s
preference for rule-based adjudication. Second, the Supreme Court should
be careful to avoid going too far in enforcing standard-based adjudication
that contradicts well-grounded policy justified by the Federal Circuit based
on its experience and expertise analyzing issues arising in patent cases. In
this regard, the Supreme Court would do well not to forget the statement it
made nearly one hundred years ago in an intellectual property case:
“Uniformity and certainty in rules of property are often more important
498

Duffy, supra note 235, at 342.
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and desirable than technical correctness.”

499
Rock Spring Distilling Co. v. W.A. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312, 320 (1918) (quoting Layton
Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 39 (8th Cir. 1910)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

